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During the last decade municipal employee unions have emerged as a
powerful new force in city politics. They have gained some influence over
public policy matters as well as over the traditional union concerns - wages,
hours, and conditions of work. One reason for this development is that in
the public sector the traditional bargaining subjects, particularly conditions
of work, often overlap issues which city officials have normally viewed as
"policy decisions." Thus, collective bargaining combined with political
activities (e.g. lobbying and electoral politics) enables public employee
unions to play a major determining role in the lives of our cities.
A primary purpose of this study is to examine specific aspects of this
newly achieved union influence and to consider some of its consequences. The
examination proceeds through a case study which analyzes the struggle of a
single union, the Detroit Police Officers Association (DPOA), against a
particular city policy requiring Detroit employees to live within the city's
limits.
Although some of the facts of the Detroit police residency dispute are
unique, the union's resistance to a residency policy is not uncommon. The
Detroit controversy is part of the larger debate in many cities today about
whether there should be residency requirements for city employees. The
strongest opponents to such rules are municipal employee unions. The case
presents the arguments both for and against police residency rules, in par-
ticular, and city employee residency rules, in general.
To date the DPOA has failed to abolish Detroit's residency requirement,
but it has succeeded in blocking enforcement of the policy as well as
achieving other related goals. In analyzing the outcome of the case and
the forces contributing to it, the study identifies and explains the union's
impacts, the sources of its power, and the limitations on its influence. A
major source of the union's strength is collective bargaining. Thus, the
paper also looks at a few more general issues about public sector labor
relations. Finally, it considers the specific consequences of the DPOA's
opposition to Detroit's residency requirement and also suggests a few of
the broader policy consequences of the growth and activities of public em-
ployee unions.
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The Unions vs. City Policy
On [May 28, 1968 the Detroit Common Council passed a law requiring all
city employees to live within the corporate limits. The ordinance categorically
denied police the right to apply for waivers despite the fact that it allowed
that privilege to virtually all other municipal workers.
Detroit's residency legislation soon became one of the most controversial
topics in. local. government and was well-known nationally. The conflict over
the ordinance is part of the larger question of whether there should be resi-
dency requirements for municipal employees, an issue in many parts of the
country today. The strongest opponents to such rules are public employee
unions. Detroit's residency requirement became the focus of an eight-year
struggle between the city and the Detroit Police Officers Association (DPOA),
the union representing the city's approximately 4,000 police officers. The
controversy became a major test of that particular union's influence in city
politics.
Municipal employee unions, of which the DPOA is one, emerged from the
drive to organize the public sector during the fifties and sixties. Over
the past decade these unions have asserted themselves as a powerful new
force in the social, economic, and political lives of metropolitan areas.
They influence the operation of municipal governments, the delivery of
public services, and the distribution of resources and power in urban America.
Because of their success in achieving substantial economic gains, these unions
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currently are being blamed for some of the fiscal problems plaguing our cities.
Moreover, public employee organizations have also succeeded in gaining a
degree of control over personnel matters and policy determinations.
A major purpose of this study is to explore and analyze specific as-
pects of this newly established union influence, particularly as it relates to
public policy and other nonmonetary issues. By examining the DPOA's struggle
against the residency legislation, I will attempt to identify and explain
several of the union's impacts, the sources of its power, the limitations
on its influence, and the consequences of its activities.
Although to date the DPOA has failed to eliminate the residency require-
ment, it did succeed in blocking enforcement of the city's policy for over
eight years. How, why, and under what conditions did the union achieve this
end? What, if any, other goals did the DPOA accomplish? Have the union's
activities also influenced related issues such as personnel recruitment,
minority hiring, and the delivery of police services? Is the DPOA interested
in affecting the distribution of police jobs? If so, why and how? Who
benefits and who loses from the union's activities?
A major source of union power is collective bargaining. Thus, the case
also raises several issues about police labor negotiations and the broader
currents of public sector labor relations: Who was responsible for bar-
gaining? Was the scope of bargaining subjects affected, and if so, how? What im-
pact, if any, does this have on public policy? What is the relationship
between arbitration and city policy making, and what are the implications
for the unions and the cities? What is the relationship between the bar-
gaining system and institutional decision makers such as the courts?
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What role did the judiciary play in the outcome of the case?
I have chosen the case study technique to probe these questions. The
state-of-the-art for measuring union impacts is not well developed. The
most sophisticated methodological research to date involves only quantitative
models concerning the influence of unionization on wages. Exploring impacts
which cannot be translated into monetary terms necessitates a more quali-
tative form of analysis, and an understanding of nonmonetary consequences
is particularly important in the public sector where union activity often
involves public policy questions. In relating the "story" of the DPOA's
struggle against Detroit's residency policy, a case study approach provides
an opportunity for an in-depth investigation of the way various forces,
conditions, individuals, and organizations interacted to produce a particu-
lar outcome. It is flexible enough to explore many issues, and, at the
same time, it is focused enough to develop an understanding of the relation-
ships among several factors. The study should also provide some useful in-
sights to a few of the policy implications of the growth of municipal em-
ployee unions.
The remainder of-this chapter contains background information about
the DPOA, passage of the residency ordinance, and reasons for the contro-
versy. Chapter 2 outlines the DPOA's first legal attack against the or-
dinance based on constitutional grounds. Chapter 3 describes an alternative
challenge through the bargaining system. It began as an unfair labor prac-
tice charge and eventually proceeded through the courts by appeals. The
fourth chapter discusses the arbitration proceedings as a continuation of
the bargaining process and culmination of the union's eight-year struggle.
The epilogue presents the important variables which shaped the outcome
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of the case. It assesses the overall impact of the DPOA on Detroit's
residency policy and on related issues and also considers the reasons for
the union's failure to eliminate the requirements. This chapter also briefly
looks at some of the broader policy consequences associated with the activities
of the DPOA and other public employee unions. But before discussing the de-
tails of Detroit's residency policy, it is useful to understand something
about the general background and purposes of such requirements.
Residency Requirements: Background and Theory
The practice of requiring city residence of public employees originally
developed from the political machine tradition of late nineteenth-century
America. A primary function of the machine and source of power for ward
leaders was the distribution of jobs. By requiring city residence of muni-
cipal employees, machine leaders could ensure patronage positions for voters,
and, by so doing, they could enhance their own control.
The first concerted efforts to abolish residency requirements developed
along with the municipal reform movement during the first third of the twen-
tieth century. In keeping with their goals of eliminating corruption and
increasing efficiency, the reformers sought to upgrade the caliber of civil
service recruits by removing "politics" from work assignments. They reasoned
that the abolishment of residency rules and the expansion of recruitment
boundaries would improve the available labor pool, would make appointments
more selective, and would upgrade the general quality of personnel.
Police reformers, especially after 1930, pushed for elimination of resi-
dency requirements as an important condition for "professionalizing" the
police and improving their reputation for corruption and inefficiency.2
-5-
However, they encountered enormous opposition. City residents and elected
officials favored residency rules for public safety workers based on the
need they perceived for the immediate availability of police and firefighters
in emergencies. In addition, the rank and file vigorously opposed the suggested
residency reforms. Especially during the depression years, public service
jobs were quite desirable because they provided a degree of economic security.
Thus, police departments had far more applicants than positions, and their
problem was one of selection. Eliminating residency requirements would force
city residents into competition for obtaining scarce jobs, whereas several
groups, particularly the police, still depended on patronage as a major source
of employment.3
After World War II a series of changes caused public employees and some
employers to modify their positions on residency. With the rapid growth of
cities and conditions brought about by urbanization, public service jobs be-
came more demanding at the same time that living and working conditions became
worse. Police work in particular became more difficult as public awareness
of crime increased and racial tension in large cities intensified. Along
with other employee groups, police began to prefer living in the suburbs
where housing was more readily available to whites and racial unrest was
virtually nonexistent, largely due to de facto segregation. Improved trans-
portation and communications facilitated commuting to work in the metro-
politan areas.
At the same time, the ethnic turnover in the cities presented a serious
threat to the job security of municipal employees. Elimination of residency
requirements would allow the already-employed public workers to move to the
suburbs while they maintained their city jobs. On the other hand, retention
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of the requirements would force public employees to live in the urban cen-
ters unless they were prepared to forfeit their jobs by choosing to move to
the suburbs, thus opening job access to inner-city minorities. These pressures
motivated the rank and file to join the reformers in pressing for repeal
4
of the residency rules. The movement gained further support during the
period of full employment in the fifties when cities allegedly were having
difficulty attracting enough qualified civil service workers. Police ad-
ministrators along with other public employers urged abolishing residency
rules to aid recruitment and retention.
The combination of all these factors resulted in the elimination of residency
rules for police in most major cities by the early sixties. Dallas abandoned
its police residency requirement during World War II due to manpower shortages.
During the fifties, Los Angeles followed suit, largely in response to housing
shortages which cropped up during the war years. The Seattle Civil Service
Commission waived police residency requirements in the late fifties, and a
1960 charter amendment in Portland eliminated the residency requirement there
for all city employees. During the sixties the state legislatures repealed
police residency rules in New York and Boston.5
Thus, the DPOA's campaign to remove Detroft's police residency rule came
at the end of a general trend to liberalize or repeal such requirements. At
about this same time, increasing pressure primarily from central city minorities
resulted in the first attempts to reimpose residency restrictions in a few
major cities. After the race riots of the sixties, minority groups took up
the banner for reasons of job access and community control over public services.
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To understand why Detroit's Common Council responded to the DPOA's
nonresidency demand by restricting rather than liberalizing the existing
rule, it is necessary to understand something about the background of the
DPOA, the history of Detroit's residency policy, and the political and
social climate of the city around 1968.
Fact Finding and the Detroit Police Residency Issue
In July 1965 Michigan passed the Public Employment Relations Act (PERA)
which allowed public employees to select a collective bargaining representative
and to enter into negotiations with their employer. About six months later
Detroit recognized the Detroit Police Officers Association (DPOA) as the ex-
clusive bargaining agent for all the city's police officers. Originally
founded in 1944 as a fraternal and benevolent association, the DPOA in 1966
included approximately 3,000 of the police department's 3,300 officers as
members.8
In March 1966 the DPOA and the city began extensive collective bar-
gaining which continued, with interruptions, until 1968 without resolving
several issues. Much of the delay and confusion resulted from unanswered
questions concerning procedures and authority for bargaining in the public
sector. Frustrated by the process, the DPOA engaged in a ticket slowdown
and blue flu epidemic in May and June 1967. This militance helped tremen-
dously to solidify the union's strength.
A month later, Detroit experienced serious racial riots which were to
have an immense impact on the police labor dispute. Following the civil
disturbances, a fact-finding panel was established to make recommendations
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on the unresolved bargaining issues, among which was the DPOA's demand that
the residency requirement for police officers be abolished.
At this time, police residency was regulated by a department rule which
was formalized in 1944 after many years of informal effect. The regulation
simply reads, "All members of the department shall reside within the city
limits." 2 The personnel department often recruited outside the city, but
department policy required new officers to move to Detroit within a year of
their appointments. Although the rule does not provide for exceptions, over
the years a custom developed whereby police commissioners waived the require-
ment in hardship cases and in situations of unusual necessity.
Somewhat unusually, police officers in Detroit are not members of the
civil service and, accordingly, are not governed by civil service regulations,
including its residency requirement.1 3 This allowed the police department to con-
trol its own residency policy. The Civil Service Commission, unlike the police
department, only granted waivers for job-related reasons such as location and
nature of work when it deemed such exceptions necessary to the public interest.1 4
When, in 1964, dissatisfied civil service employees filed a legal suit
against the civil service residency rule based on constitutional grounds,
the police still seemed satisfied with their department's waiver policy which
was liberal enough to accommodate the needs of both the city and the rank
and file.. In fact, residency was not a major issue at the time the police
labor negotiations began in 1966. But by 1967 changing conditions modified
the desires of the police and prompted them to pursue more seriously their
nonresidency demand.
Increasing demands and pressures resulting from the city's tense racial
situation caused more and more officers to choose homes in the suburbs as a
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source of relief. Although the police commissioner at this time, Ray
Girardin, favored a liberal policy of exceptions, union members may have
wanted to ensure their future freedom to move by formally liberalizing or
eliminating the requirements. Reliance on the unpredictable discretion
of the commissioner, a political appointee, could be risky.
Another factor very likely contributing to intensified DPOA concern
with the residency rule was Mayor Jerome Cavanagh's campaign for minority
hiring in the police department. Elected in 1961, Cavanagh had earned a
strong national reputation as a liberal. In the post-riot days liberals
and civil. libertarians charged the police department, approximately 95-percent
white,l5 with brutality and racism and advocated integration of the
force. According to the conventional wisdom, a residency requirement as
a precondition of employment would facilitate minority hiring by forcing
the police department to recruit its officers from city residents, the ma-
jority of whom are black. Even if residency were not a recruiting require-
ment but only a continuing condition of employment, many nonresident officers
probably still would choose to remain in the suburbs and therefore would
have to quit their jobs. In this way job opportunities would be opened
to inner-city residents. Thus, Cavanagh's minority hiring campaign combined
with a strictly enforced residency requirement seriously threatened the
primarily white police union.
In February 1968 the fact-finding panel issued its report and recommended
that the DPOA's nonresidency demand was not unreasonable. The panel noted
that the police department was facing a severe manpower shortage. The turn-
over rate was excessive and recruitment inadequate. It reasoned that
-10-
elimination of the residency requirement would help recruitment and retention.
Panel members were especially concerned about ensuring the adequacy and re-
liability of the police force in the face of future racial disturbances.
Although the fact-finding recommendations were not legally binding,
for Mayor Cavanagh they were binding politically. In the aftermath of the
riots, the administration was anxious to make some concessions to the police
as acknowledgement for their performance during the disturbances and as
insurance for cooperation in the event of other civil outbreaks. Therefore,
as recommended by the panel, the city did approve police salary increases.
However, the mayor could not afford, as the panel also suggested, to abolish the
residency requirement entirely, especially in the wake of post-riot sensi-
tivity to police-community relations.
There was strong sentiment among city residents, especially blacks,
that police officers should be residents of the community they served.
Conservatives and frightened citizens were demanding more police protection.
For many of them the importance of the residency requirement was driven home
during the riots which occurred during the summer at a time of particularly
low manpower. Many officers had to be called in from residences, including
summer homes, which were located long distances from the city. People ex-
pected police to live in the city where they could respond quickly to emer-
gencies.
As Cavanagh stated, "I would have departed from my senses politically
if I had agreed to abolish the requirement."1 8 However, he did believe
strongly that the issue was administrative and should remain a discretionary
prerogative of the police commissioner. During March, Detroit's Labor
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Relations Bureau and the Mayor's Office, through Controller Bernard Klein,
agreed that the residency requirement should be modified in a manner which
would continue to leave waivers to the police commissioner's discretion.
Basically, the agreement was to maintain the same police department
rule but to liberalize and formalize the rule of exceptions which, from
the administration's point of view, served a no-cost political function.l9
By making this concession and offering the union a few hundred dollars above
the fact--finding panel's $10,000 salary recommendation, the city bargained
informally with the DPOA to delay implementation of its wage increases until
July, the beginning of the new fiscal year. This agreement helped the ad-
ministration hold the line on raises and avoid reaction from other city
unions. 2)
The residency provision was part of a "package agreement" contingent
upon adoption in totality by the Detroit Common Council and ratification by
the DPOA membership. Shortly after the union ratified the package but before
its approval by the Common Council, Commissioner Girardin issued waivers to
approximately thirty police officers. Presumably these exceptions were to
help boost morale after the riots and to aid retention. 1
This newest round of waivers sparked sharp criticism from several sources.
Civil service employees, whose challenge to their residency rule was pending
in the courts, objected strenuously to the police exceptions. The police
residency policy was an especially sore point with firefighters who, as public
safety officers, traditionally demanded parity with police. In addition, many
blacks as well as whites fearful of crime opposed the waivers.
Several complaints, particularly from firemen, came to the attention of
the Common Council as did word of the agreement between the Mayor's Office,
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the Labor Relations Bureau, and the DPOA. In spite of or perhaps because of
its awareness of this agreement, the council went ahead and initiated its
own more stringent residency legislation which covered both police and civil
service workers. The orientation of the nine-member council at the time was
basically conservative, although the DPOA could usually depend on several
council allies, including one former police detective inspector. Thus, it
was somewhat curious that the legislation was passed so quickly and unanimously
despite the objections of the DPOA.
The Residency Ordinance
John McKinlay, Assistant Corporation Counsel at this time and drafter
of the ordinance, has suggested that the pending challenge to the civil
service rule and stepped-up complaints from civil service employees, es-
pecially firemen, motivated the council to begin thinking about the resi-
dency legislation. The majority of council members favored residency
rules, although the specific reasons for support varied among individuals.
McKinlay claimed that when the council heard of Cavanagh's informal agreement
with the DPOA, it became seriously concerned about pressure from other city
employees to liberalize or eliminate the policy. Consequently, in early
April, it formally requested that the city's lawyers draft a residency
ordinance.2 3 The council then notified the director of the Civil Service
Commission and asked him to attend a meeting to discuss the matter. No
similar notification was sent to the police commissioner.
The original request to McKinlay was to prepare an ordinance without
disturbing the existing residency exemptions.24 The council later requested
-13-
a provision that the Civil Service Commission submit its recommendations
for waivers to the legislative body for approval. Councilman Mel Ravitz
raised the question of whether the police and fire commissioners should
25
also be required to seek council approval of their waivers. However,
there is no indication that this matter was ever resolved.
While the draft of the ordinance was being prepared, a public hearing
was scheduled for May 17 to discuss the proposed legislation. This was a
period of intense polarization in the city, and the hearing proved to be
26
highly emotional. Among those attending the meeting were six members
of the Common Council, representatives of the Corporation Counsel's Office,
the Police Department, and the Civil Service Commission, the DPOA, the
Detroit Firefighters Association (DFFA), and a few private citizens.
The strongest opposition was presented by Carl Parsell, President of
the DPOA. Parsell cited the February 1968 recommendation of the fact-finding
panel and reiterated the belief of the Mayor's Office that modification of
the rule was necessary to aid recruitment and promote the city's best in-
terests. He reminded the council that the police department was still 400
officers below its authorized and budgeted strength. Parsell maintained
that the fact-finding report had bolstered police morale tremendously and
claimed that passage of the ordinance would again lower morale because it
would impair the "professional" image of police which the panel sought to
establish.
The DPOA leader also pointed out that adoption of the ordinance would
undermine the confidence of police and other city employee groups in the
collective bargaining and fact-finding processes. As far as the union was
-14-
concerned, passage would be a flagrant example of unilateral conduct on
the part of a public employer in violation of PERA. Parsell maintained that
the residency agreement was part of a total package resulting from good
faith bargaining by the mayor and his staff. He threatened that if the
council intended to "pick and choose" items from a negotiated package agree-
ment, the union would insist on renegotiating not only residency but all
other matters in the package. 7
Notwithstanding DPOA opposition, a little more than a week after the
hearing the Common Council adopted the residency ordinance to become effec-
tive on June 6. In large part, the vote seemed to be reflective of the
times. Council members were subject to increasing pressure from blacks,
who now constituted over 40 percent of the population, and whites fearful
of crime to maintain the residency policy. Following the riots, the topics
of community control and improved police-community relations received con-
siderable attention. A residency policy was regarded as one important means
to help achieve these ends. In addition, the council argued that residency
rules would improve the performance of public employees since paying city
taxes would encourage interest in their neighborhoods and commitment to their
communities.
Councilman Nicholas Hood, a black clergyman and one of the strongest
supporters of the ordinance, addressed some of the racial implications of
the policy. First, he identified black resentment to the feeling among whites
that they could escape the growing black population by moving outside the
city. 9 The residency ordinance would prevent white flight to the suburbs
where blacks cannot move as readily. Hood also expressed the concern of
the black community that if the police, most of whom are white, were allowed
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to live outside the city, the force would become an "army of occupation."
He commented on the internal roadblocks to hiring in the police department
and alluded to the conventional wisdom that residency requirements might
facilitate ethnic turnover on the police force. He said, "...if the police
department had a truly open recruitment policy...where members of the black
community could get these jobs, there would be no problem at all."30
The councilman was quick to point out that a residency policy was vital
to the preservation of the city not only for social and racial reasons but
for financial considerations as well. City residents pay a 2-percent income
tax whereas nonresidents pay only .5 percent. Hood estimated there were
approximately 300,000 suburbanites working in Detroit, taking income outside
the city and thus contributing to its fiscal plight. He stressed Detroit's
dependence on the middle-class city employees to provide support:
We cannot afford in the town to lose those in the 8, 10,
thousand dollar income brackets. These are the people who
give stability to a community, whether they be policemen
or some other kind of Public servants... a town is built
off the middle-class.3
Hood's basic feeling was that people paid by the city should support it by
spending their money in and paying taxes to the city.
These financial arguments had broad appeal to conservatives who con-
stituted the majority of the council. Interestingly, post-riot conditions
were such that financial, social, and racial considerations led to a coalescence
of interests among conservatives and liberals which contributed to the unanimous
passage o) the ordinance. Council members agreed the legislation had the
functional import of backing the civil service rule and the moral import
of declaring a position crucial to the effective operation of Detroit.
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However, consensus about the desirability of a residency policy does not
explain its ultimate rigid application to police officers as distinguished
from civil service employees.
For no clear reasons, the approved legislation did not include the
originally discussed proposal for Common Council approval of civil service
waivers. Instead, the ordinance specified that the Civil Service Commission
had the authority to grant exceptions to general city employees. Its only
responsibility was to report the waivers to the mayor and the Common Council.
No mention was made of police residency exceptions. In light of the com-
plaints about police waivers, there was a growing feeling among council
members that the police commissioner was abusing his discretion. Enact-
ment of an ordinance gave the city a degree of control over the residency
enforcements which it did not have previously. However, there is no
evidence that the council ever clearly resolved the question of if and how
police waivers should exist.
According to John McKinlay, exclusion of police residency waivers was
a conscious decision by the Corporation Counsel's office. McKinlay said
the ordinance was basically modeled after the civil service residency rule
which on]Ly allows exceptions for job-related reasons which would promote
the city"s best interest (see n. 14). The city's lawyers argued that police
have no authority outside Detroit, and, therefore, they would have no
legitimate work-related reasons for residency exceptions. In addition,
the prevailing view was that the special nature and visibility of law
enforcement work made residency even more important for police than for
general city employees.3 3
Following passage of the legislation, council members claimed
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upon questioning to be less clear about their own intentions and understanding
of the ordinance. When Councilman Hood was asked what considerations, if
any, had prompted the distinction between police officers and other city
employees, Hood replied that he did not know since, as far as he was concerned,
police officers were not intended to be singled out. Hood maintained he un-
derstood. that the ordinance gave the police commissioner or the council the
power to issue police residency waivers.
When similarly questioned, Councilman Ravitz stated:
It's my understanding that this ordinance does not in
any way alter the longstanding right of the Commissioner
to grant a waiver for specific reasons as had been the
case before...So far as I am concerned, when I supported
this [ordinance], I assumed that the waiver in the special,
the unique case, would be still carried out by the Police
Commissioner and it is written here that the Civil Ser-
vice Commission may waive the residency requirement upon
a finding that such waiver would serve the best interest
of the city. I thought that all employees were, there-
fore, taken care of.
Councilman Philip Van Antwerp, the former police detective -inspector, main-
tained that it was not until after the legislation was approved that he
realized the discrepancy between the civil service and police waiver poli-
cies. At that point, he claimed to withdraw his support of the ordinance,
36
arguing that it should apply equally to all city employees.
Whether the council actually intended to exclude police residency
waivers is hard to say. City attorneys suggested that this probably was
the case. DPOA lawyers hinted that council members seeking reelection
made the exclusion to gain support of those blacks and whites who favored
37
strict police residency rules.
Committed to the general need for a city residency policy, the council
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may have wanted to avoid a situation whereby other city employees, es-
pecially firefighters, could argue for nonresidency based on the police
case. Because they could not control the police commissioner's discretion
to grant waivers, the council may have decided to eliminate this option
entirely. Or perhaps, as suggested by the city's lawyers, the members did
not feel there were legitimate reasons for police residency exceptions.
For whatever reasons the exclusion was made, intentional or not, once
the matter became a public issue, it was politically awkward for council
members to admit to the omission of police waivers. The ordinance in-
curred the wrath of the DPOA which, by this time, had established itself
as perhaps the city's most militant and powerful public- employee union.
The DPOA expected to use its newly achieved leverage to alter Detroit's
residency policy. Immediately following passage of the legislation, the
union undertook the first of what was to become a long series of attacks




The Legal Issues and Arguments
On July 26 the DPOA initiated a legal attack against the city, chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the residency ordinance. Despite the fact
that courts in most public jurisdictions have upheld the right of municipali-
ties to adopt and enforce residency requirements, the union, guided by its
competent lawyer, Winston Livingston, was optimistic about winning the case.
It felt that the particulars of the Detroit situation provided compelling
arguments against the legislation: 1) the ordinance denied police due process
of law by unreasonably restricting their right to choice of residences;
2) by failing to provide police the same conditional waivers granted to other
city employees, the legislation created an arbitrary and unreasonable class-
ification in violation of the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States
and Michigan Constitutions; and 3) the ordinance conflicted with the City
Charter which gives complete authority over the police department to the
police commissioner.
Due Process: The United States and Michigan Constitutions both provide that
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law.2 The DPOA argued that the liberty safeguarded by these clauses
guarantees an individual the right to live where and as he or she pleases,
and that the residency ordinance infringed on this right.3
The city did not deny this but asserted that the ordinance validly
limited this right in that it bore a rational relationship to the achievement
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of a legitimate state purpose. The use of this criterion inevitably raised
the question of the purposes of the ordinance which, as discussed earlier,
were not entirely clear. Its language simply stated that it was "necessary
for the preservation of the peace, health, safety and welfare" of Detroit
citizens. The city argued several ways in which it believed the legislation
promoted these goals. First, it claimed the residency requirement would
help improve the quality of services rendered by city employees. It argued
that resident police officers would perform their jobs better as a result of
commitment to the community, greater interest in work, and increased accoun-
tability and honesty. City officials reasoned that officers subject to the
complaints of neighbors would carry out their tasks more carefully. Further-
more, they argued that home ownership was an important way of ensuring in-
terest in local affairs.S
Proponents of the ordinance also claimed that police should reside
within corporate limits to be readily available for emergencies. Closely
related to this rationale was the argument about the value of off-duty
officers. Police are required to be armed at all times and technically are
on duty twenty-four hours a day. Therefore, the city claimed, residents
benefit from the presence of off-duty officers who have a deterrent effect
on crime. In addition, it argued that police-community relations are im-
proved by citizen encounters and informal associations with off-duty patrol
members.
The DPOA vigorously denied that the ordinance reasonably promoted the
public's health, safety, or welfare. It further asserted that even had the
legislation any relationship to a valid government objective, it was so
nebulous as to be an insufficient basis for denying a fundamental right to
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police. Furthermore, it maintained that a city residency rule was meaning-
less because police officers do not serve areas or territory; they serve
people. Suburban residents work, shop, and attend entertainment in the city;
city residents do the same in the suburbs. On this ground, the union argued
that officers serve the entire metropolitan area. The DPOA used this same
argument to refute the city's contention that municipal employees would take
greater interest in their work than would nonresidents.
Concerning the availability of officers for emergencies, the DPOA noted
that a police officer living in a Detroit suburb could conceivably live closer
to his place of work than if he lived in some areas of the city. The union
suggested that if availability for emergency calls was the major purpose of
the police residency rule, a more reasonable approach would be to require
officers to live within a certain number of miles of their assigned beats.9
This is the policy practiced in Washington, D.C. and a few other jurisdictions.
The union also argued there is no empirical evidence which proves that
law enforcement is enhanced by residency or impaired by nonresidency. In
particular, it pointed out the lack of hard data to support the contention
that off-duty police have a deterrent effect on crime. One officer commented:
They feel if I live in the city I'm gonna do a better
job. And that's strictly a big lie...That we'll curb
crime more? If I'm here, I do the best I can for eight
hours, but if I go home, I want to feel I drop the job
and just be the guy next door.
This ain't the type of job you take because of hours
or money. A guy who's gonna be a good policeman is
gonna do a good job whether he lives here or not.'0
To buttress its arguments, the DPOA called on former Police Commissioner
Girardin who testified that in his opinion there was absolutely no relation
11
between city residency and performance of regular police duties. DPOA
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lawyer Win Livingston argued, if anything, the residency rule could have
a negative effect on police performance by lowering morale.
Although during the hearings the city placed heavy emphasis on the
improved job performance rationale, it also offered the financial and racial
reasons which motivated the council to pass the ordinance. The DPOA argued
that to the extent the ordinance was designed to solve economic and racial
problems, it was unauthorized by law. It charged that, in effect, the
city had attempted to disguise a revenue measure as an enactment under its
police power and that it had no right to do so. In response, the city
claimed police were asking for a tax break by requesting residency waivers
since nonresidents only pay 5-percent income tax whereas residents pay
2-percent.
Concerning the racial overtones of the ordinance the union argued that,
in theor, the nation's laws provide blacks and whites with equal opportunities
for employment, education, and housing. According to the DPOA, a city govern-
ment has no authority to limit the rights of the white population because
equality does not exist in fact for black people:
If the purpose of the ordinance is to hold white people
in the city by law because black people must live there
by practice, the purpose of the ordinance not only contra-
venes the law of our land, but has no reasonable relation
to the health, safety, and welfare of the community as
those terms are used to elineate the areas in which police
powers may be exercised.
As far as the union was concerned, the police residency requirement simply
constituted an arbitrary restraint which accomplished nothing except to
deter officer recruitment.
The city maintained the requirement was not arbitrary because it only
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concerned individuals choosing employment as police officers and city em-
ployees of Detroit.1 3 It regarded the residency rule as a reasonable con-
dition of employment. Furthermore, it argued there is no constitutional
right to live where one pleases and at the same time insist upon public
employment. In fact, there is no constitutional guarantee to government
employment. The city concluded this argument by criticizing the police
for wanting the residency rule abolished and by speculating on their real
motives. Among these were avoidance of city taxes and social status reasons
including "keeping up with the Joneses;" avoidance of contacts with certain
racial and religious groups; and escape from city tensions.14
Equal Protection: The DPOA argued that if residency was determined to be
unrelated to job performance, the ordinance should be held invalid in that
it discriminated against nonresidents by opening police jobs to city residents
only. The union also maintained that by excluding police from residency
waivers, which were allowed to civil service employees (see Chapter 1, n. 28),
the ordinance furthermore discriminated against officers. It complained
that the city failed to specify a reasonable basis for making this distinction.
The DPOA contended that the council's reasons for police restrictions should
be equally applicable to civil servants -- firefighters, water and power
maintenance crews, and snow-removal workers -- who also provided "vital"
public services. The union concluded that this biased treatment of police
rendered the ordinance unconstitutional. 5
Conflict with City Charter: The union's third point was that the ordinance
infringed upon the powers delegated to the police commissioner by the City
Charter and, to this extent, should be declared void. The DPOA pointed out
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that if the court found the ordinance invalid because it violated the Charter,
a determination of the constitutional questions would not be necessary. As
it was stated in Williams v. Detroit Civil Service Commission, 15 Mich App 55
(1963), "As a general proposition, courts will not reach a constitutional
question if they can decide the case on nonconstitutional grounds."1' 6
To support its position, the union cited portions of the Detroit Charter
pertinent to the police commissioner's authority. It claimed that none of
the sections governing the appointment, promotion, and termination of police
officers makes such activities subject to the Common Council's control or to
city ordinances. It also relied heavily on the section which provides
that
The powers and duties of the commissioner, which shall
be exercised and performed as herein provided and in accor-
dance with the laws of the state and the ordinances of the
City, shall be as follows:
(a) He shall assume and exercise supervision over the police
department and make all proper rules for the government and
discipline thereof;...
(d) May change the titles of police officers and employees
under him, except deputies, designating such titles as he
may see fit, creating whatever offices and positions he
may deem necessary for the proper organization and conduct
of the department.18
The union pointed out that paragraph (d) above had been construed in
Slavin v. City of Detroit, 262 Mich 173 (1933), by the Michigan Supreme
Court which stated:
While it is true that the council may indirectly con-
trol the number of officers and employees by limiting
the appropriation, the right of appointment and removal,
increase and decrease of the force still remain in the
hands of the police commissioner and the board of fire
commissioners respectively.19
The DPOA claimed that through the residency ordinance the council was
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effectively assuming responsibility for firing police by instructing the
commissioner to discharge nonresident officers. The union concluded that
in this sense the ordinance was an attempt to govern the police department,
and, as such, it conflicted with the Charter.2 0
The union further pointed out that for years the police department had
handled its own recruitment and personnel problems without outside inter-
ference. The police commissioner established height, age, and educational
requirements. The council's control over the department was limited to
the purse strings. Now, the union claimed, because of social pressures,
the council was attempting to assert control over certain aspects of the
department for which it had no authority.
The city asserted that the broad powers of the Common Council did give
it authority to enact the residency legislation. According to the City
Charter, the council's legislative powers include the rights
To enact ordinances to carry into effect the powers con-
ferred and the duties imposed upon the city by the con-
stitution and the laws of the state, to make operative
the provisions of this charter and to promote the general
peace, health, safety, welfare and good government of the
city...21
To execute all legislative powers of the city including the
power to adopt, continue, amend and repeal city ordinances...22
To "enact such ordinances as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions" of specified chapters dealing with the
powers and duties of various executive officers and depart-
ments, one of which is the chapter dealing with the office
of Commissioner of Police.2 3
As the union had done, the city also cited the section which said that the
powers and duties of the commissioner should be exercised in accordance
with the state laws and city ordinances. Unlike the union, though, the
-26-
city interpreted this to-mean that the police commissioner's authority was
clearly subordinate to the residency ordinance.
The city relied in part on the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Kennedy v. City of Newark, 148A (2d) 473, which said it was not for the
judiciary to entertain and resolve such issues as the wisdom and justice
of a residency requirement. The court concerns itself with the exercise
of power: "appeals relating to policy must be addressed to the local
legislative body or to the legislature itself."2 5 Similarly, Detroit
officials claimed that where grievances of citizens stem from an authorized
government policy decision, any redress must be in the legislative or poli-
tical forum. 6 The city maintained that by restraining enforcement of the
residency ordinance, the Michigan court would seriously flaunt the separation
of powers doctrine.
Circuit Court Decision
In October 1969, more than a year after the union's suit was initiated,
Wayne County Circuit Court Judge Thomas Roumell held that the residency
ordinance was defective in two respects:
[I]t attempts to regulate the internal rules and reg-
ulations of the police department in contravention of
the City Charter which places this power and authority
in the police commissioner.
[O]n its face, the ordinance discriminates arbitrarily
against police officers as contrasted with all other
city employees by making a residency requirement an
absolute condition of their employment, and in so doing,
denies them the equal protection of the law.2 7
The lower court declined to rule on whether the ordinance deprived police
of due process of law, but answered "no" in dicta in a footnote:
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The court does not find it necessary to reach or
decide the issue of the constitutionality of resi-
dence requirements for public employees... Even so,
and for the purpose only of this footnote, though
it be obiter dictum, the court can see no inequity
or injustice to the objective of the ordinance here
in question had it but applied evenly and equally
to all employees of the city. This court would
agree that a residency requirement alone would not
necessarily make a better city employee. The court
would allow, however, that a residency requirement
assumes to create the opportunity of employment
and employment benefits to its own citizens who
help, in the final analysis to finance its public
services through taxes, purchasing power and other
such involvements and can be therefore said to be
instilled with a keener civic and proprietary in-
terest in the dispensing and fulfillment of public
services. Moreover, such a requirement can be also
said to produce for citizens of any government en-
tity the insulation of public concern for the gen-
eral welfare and creates on the part of public em-
ployees a motivation for exemplary performance on
duty.2 8
Concerning the proper source of authority for residency requirements,
the court: stated that the language of the Charter, as cited by the DPOA
and the city, did not make explicit the power limits of either the police
commissioner or the Common Council. According to the circuit court's in-
terpretat:ion, although the Charter did direct the police commissioner to
obey the city's laws, it did not authorize the council to reorder or re-
structure the police department's internal organization. The court noted,
as the union had pointed out (see p. 24 above), that the commissioner was
responsible for making "...all proper rules for the government and discipline..."
of the police department. It concluded that the residency requirement, if any,
is the kind of regulation for which the charter delegates responsibility to
the police commissioner.2 9
In deciding that the ordinance discriminated against police, the
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court noted that the city failed to offer any reasons for distinguishing
police from other city employees concerning residency waivers. In the court's
opinion, if any valid reasons could be presented for requiring unconditional
residence of police, they would have to apply equally to other city employees.
Members of the DPOA hailed the decision as a tremendous victory. Angered
city officials immediately launched an appeal.
Appeals
In late FebrUary 1970 the Michigan Supreme Court agreed to review by
direct appeal the circuit court decision. This time the city was careful
to respond to the DPOA's equal protection argument. It claimed the ordinance
merely recognized the facts of a policeman's employment which, in its normal
course, is never outside city boundaries. Therefore, the city maintained
since residency waivers are only allowed for work-related reasons, there
was no basis for permitting police exceptions. The city concluded that
the ordinance did not violate equal protection because a policeman's presence
in the city is so closely identified with his work that, unlike other city
employees, he would have no justifiable need for waivers.
To buttress its original argument that there was no reasonable basis
for distinguishing police from civil service residency waivers, the union
cited testimony relevant to the issues of recruitment and personnel shortages.
It called attention to the city's admission that in situations of personnel
shortages, for instance in nursing, the residency requirement could be
waived. The union claimed such a shortage existed in the police department.
Former Police Commissioner Girardin testified that just prior to the enactment
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of the ordinance, the department had had difficulty recruiting new officers.
He went on, "We have never filled our authorized strength, and our authorized
strength, in my opinion, has never been adequate to meet the needs of the
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city." He also testified that the department would lose a substantial number
of men -- approximately 1,700 -- in the next few years and that the residency
rule hampered recruitment. Robert Quaid, Director of Personnel, testified
that, from January through July 1969, seventy-two men had resigned from the
department, and 58 percent gave the residency requirement as a reason.
In deciding the case, the Michigan Supreme Court defined three issues:
1) whether the council can legislate a residency requirement for city em-
ployees which includes police, or whether any residency requirement for police
is the exclusive authority of the police commissioner; 2) whether the council
has the legal authority to legislate a residency requirement for city em-
ployees; and 3) whether the unconditional provision requiring police to live
in the city while permitting waivers for other city employees is unconstitu-
tional.3 5
The court decided against the union. The justices again looked to the
City Charter for a definition of the powers and duties of the Common Council
and the police commissioner. In particular, it noted the section providing
that:
In addition to the rights, powers, duties and lia-
bilities of officers prescribed in this Charter, all
officers, whether elected or appointed, shall have such
other rights, powers, duties and liabilities, subject
to and consistent with the provisions hereof as the
common council may deem expedient and shall prescribe
by ordinance.3 6
The court construed this clearly to mean that the police commissioner's
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powers and responsibilities are subject to validly enacted city ordinances.
Thus, it ruled, "if a residency requirement for most city employees is within
the legislative powers of the Common Council granted by the Charter, police
officers as well as other city employees are subject to the requirement." 37
Relative to the council's authority to enact such an ordinance, the
court decided that establishing a residency requirement for city employees
to promote the "general health, safety, welfare, and good government of the
city" was the kind of policy determination a legislative body is empowered
to make.3 8 In further support of the ordinance's validity the court cited
Williams v. Detroit Civil Service Commission, 383 Mich 507 (1970), which
upheld the civil service residency rule. However, as previously mentioned,
that requirement allows waivers when they serve the city's best interest,
as determined by the Civil Service Commission. The court in Williams said:
...the question of whether or not to make residence
within a city a condition of employment is one which
must be largely addressed to the legislative branch
of government. This is not to say that under all cir-
cumstances such a requirement would be reasonable and
valid.3 9
Hence, the supreme court in the DPOA case concluded that, under the Charter
and subject to the equal protection limitations discussed below, the Detroit
residency requirement was a lawful city ordinance with which the police
commissioner had to comply in exercising his authority.
The court divided five to two on the equal protection issue. The
majority held that the test for validity under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Constitution was not that there could be no selectivity in applying
ordinances, but that the classification of employees subject to or exempt
from the ordinances had to be based on natural distinguishing characteristics.
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In addition, the classification had to bear a reasonable relation to the
object of the legislation.4 1
Holding the ordinance valid in its totality, the majority concluded
that a policeman's job does have "natural and distinguishing characteristics"
from all other city employees, a distinction based largely on the perception
of police as a semi-mil:itary organization always subject to immediate mobili-
zation. Concluding that the "natural distinguishing characteristics" of the
police were reasonably related to the aims of the Detroit residency ordinance,
the court addressed the unique value of resident officers to a community:
There is a special relationship between the community
policed and a policeman. A policeman's very presence
whether actually performing a specified duty during
assigned hours, or engaged in any other activity during
off-duty hours, provides a trained person immediately
available for enforcement purposes.
Policemen are required by the department to be armed
at all times, and why is this? Simply because by such
requirement they are, no matter where they are or what
they are doing, immediately prepared to perform their
duties. They are charged with law enforcement in the
City of Detro:it, and obviously must be physically present
to perform their duties. The police force is a semi-
military organization subject at all times to immediate
mobilization, which distinguishes this type of emloy-
ment from every other in the classified service.4
The minority view was stated as follows:
The enactment of the residence requirement represents
a decision by common council that certain benefits are
acquired for the city by requiring most city employees
to reside within the municipality. It then, by allowing
a waiver of the residence requirement when waiver is in
the best interest of the city, implicitly states that,
in an individual case, the benefits attained by allowing
a waiver outweigh the assumed detriment of an employee's
outside residence.
By asserting that even when a waiver is in the best
interest of the city and that even when it is allowed to
an employee in the classified service under the same cir-
cumstances, a waiver will be denied to a police officer
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solely because he is a police officer, the ordinance
is self-defeating. Such a classification is devoid of
rationality. Any legitimate governmental purpose must
be in the best interest of the city. By denying that
which is in the best interest of the city to police
officers the classification foregoes any claim it might
have to a reasonable relation to a legitimate govern-
mental purpose. 4 3
The minority also took issue with the city's argument that the ordinance
did nothing more than recognize the facts of a policeman's employment which,
in its normal course, is never outside the city boundaries. They felt that
policemen, in relation to their work locations, are substantially similar to
firemen who are civil servants and have an opportunity for residency waivers.
Both work primarily within the city, but both may be called upon to perform
their duties outside the city as a result of the mutual aid pact between
Detroit and several nearby municipalities. 4 4
The minority claimed that even were the city's view of a policeman's
peculiar locational work requirements accepted, the ordinance could not be
read as narrowly as the city suggested. Location of employment is only
one of several factors considered in making determinations about civil service
waivers. In addition, the commission takes into account the nature of the
employee's work and all other facts concerning employment (Chapter 1, n. 28).
According to the minority, these criteria allowed the commission broad dis-
cretion in deciding individual cases. The ordinance denied police officers
the same kind of determination. Thus, the minority concluded the residency
legislation deprived police of their lawful equal protection. 4 5
Justice Thomas E. Brennan disagreed with the minority's major premise
that the ordinance invidiously discriminated against police. According to
Brennan, the classification simply amounted to a legislative determination
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that the nature of police work is such that officers should be city residents.
Interpreting the purposes of the classification, Brennan addressed some of
the policy implications of the police residency requirement, including the
conventional wisdom that residency rules would facilitate ethnic turnover
in the police department:
One of the most sensitive problems in law enforcement
today is the relationship between the police and the black
community. Over 40% of the people of Detroit are black.
Less than 10% of the population of suburban Wayne, Oakland
and Macomb Counties is black.
The Common Council of the City of Detroit has made a
difficult legislative judgment, weighing the desirability
of having a resident police force on the streets against
the detriment of losing many experienced, dedicated and
courageous officers who choose to live in the suburbs.
The common council has chosen a course which will make
it more difficult to recruit policemen and keep them.
But it has also chosen a course which will make recruit-
ment of black officers more imperative. [emphasis added]
The residency requirement is not designed solely to
assure that the officer has a greater stake in the city.
It is also intended to bring about a more cooperative
attitude among the citizenry with whom the police are in
daily contact.4 6
Thus, consistent with legal precedents, the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the Detroit residency ordinance, even with the peculiar details
of the case. Because responsibility for police officers and civil service em-
ployees is separate in Detroit and because the residency ordinance specified
different waiver provisions for these two classes, the nonconstitutional
question of the proper authority for residency requirements became a key
issue. In making its decision, the court exercised traditional restraint
according to the separation of powers doctrine and deferred to the legislative
branch. Although the court was heavily concerned with questions of legislative
policy-making powers, it also decided the constitutional question of equal
protection based largely on its interpretation of the policeman's special
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role in a community.
Three long years after the DPOA's constitutionality challenge was
begun, the Michigan Supreme Court's decision came as a major blow to the
union. Determined to pursue all possible tactics, the DPOA filed an appli-
cation for rehearing. 'The request was made only on behalf of the approximately
thirty officers who had been granted permission to live outside the city just
prior to the enactment of the ordinance. As the DPOA lawyer Winston Living-
ston commented, these men had been granted legitimate permission to move out-
side the city, and they acted accordingly. "We feel it works an undue hard-
ship on them to sell their homes, uproot their families, and move back to
Detroit.4 7 Within weeks after the application was filed in mid-September 1971,
the request was denied.
The union also filed an appeal to the United States Supreme Court on the
broader ruling upholding police residency. As defined by the DPOA, the issue
was whether there is a constitutional right to live where one pleases while
working for a municipality. Arguing that the questions raised by the appeal
were substantial, the union claimed the case presented a recurrent and impor-
tant issue to the millions of people employed by state and local units of
government.
In late February 1972 the United States Supreme Court, by a unanimous
vote, dismissed the DPOA appeal "for want of jurisdiction" and with no further
amplification. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court completed a four-year chain of legal
arguments on the constitutionality issue that wound from Detroit to Lansing
to Washington, D.C., and back again.
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Enforcement
The years of legal limbo resulting from the constitutionality challenge
prevented any systematic enforcement of the residency policy. Several officers
took advantage of the confusion to move outside the city, especially following
the 1969 ruling which declared the ordinance invalid. Throughout the challenge,
estimates varied as to the actual number of police living outside Detroit.
At the time of the original complaint, the DPOA estimated at least 400 officers
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were already living in the suburbs and another 500 wanted to move. Of
those living in the suburbs, the city claimed twenty-eight were doing so with
permission granted by the police commissioner. It said about seventy-nine
unconfirmed officers with less than one year service were also legitimately
living outside Detroit. (Until recently, new recruits were given one year
after appointment to establish city residence. A new rule requires city
residence at the time of appointment.)
The residency requirement was applied somewhat more rigorously to civil
service employees after May 1970, when the Michigan Supreme Court in Williams
upheld the validity of that commission's regulation (see p. 30 above). The
original challenge to this rule had been filed in 1964, before the residency
ordinance was passed. Because the appellate court declined the appellants'
request for it to pass on the ordinance's constitutionality, the final decision
was limited to the soundness of the civil service requirement. Following the
supreme court's ruling, ninety-five civil service workers were discovered in
violation of the commission's regulation. Most of these were reported by
department stores requesting credit references.5 1
In regard to the police residency requirement, Mayor Roman Gribbs, who
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succeeded Cavanagh in 1!370, made it clear that he wanted strict enforcement.
However, confusion and delays resulted from unresolved legal issues, one
of which concerned retroactive enforcement of the ordinance. As mentioned
previously, approximately thirty officers had been granted special permission
by former Police Commissioner Girardin to move outside the city just before
the legislation was passed. Now the question was whether they could remain
there legally.
The second group of officers affected by the ordinance's enforcement
consisted of individuals living outside Detroit without any permission.
The police commissioner at this time, John Nichols, estimated they numbered
roughly 600-1,000 and included at least 130 who had suspect plural residences,
having established Detroit addresses while their families maintained suburban
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homes. With the help of friends or relatives, these officers typically
shared apartments in the city and claimed to have separated from their spouses.
The relevant question pertaining to them was the legality of this "dual
residency."
Before these matters were resolved, in March 1972 Commissioner Nichols
established a special "residency unit." Its purpose was to investigate the
residential location of officers believed to be living outside the city and
to judge each case on its merits. City officials gave nonresident police
until September 15 to move into the city or face suspension.
By July, enforcement of the residency ordinance had become one of the
most controversial issues in Detroit government. Approximately 500 officers
admitted to outside residency. By the September 15 deadline, Nichols es-
timated about 125 of them had moved into the city, another forty officers
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had quit the police force, and an estimated 300-400 were expected to appear
before the residency unit's trial board.5 3
During the summer of 1972, Nichols held to his hard-nosed enforcement
policy. By December, however, after several cases had been reviewed, he
was convinced that "there are those instances where some latitude should be
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afforded for either medical, compassionate, or economic reasons. Though
labeling himself a strong supporter of the intent behind the ordinance, the
commissioner admitted that he felt it was too strict.
In a letter to the Common Council, Nichols recommended that an appeals
board be established to review cases in which employees requested special
waivers. He suggested that by composing the board of the secretary of the
Civil Service Commission, the police and fire commissioners, a representative
of the Mayor's Office, and members of the Common Council sufficient balance
and standardization could be achieved to avoid arbitrary decisions. He did
not think this would affect the essence of the ordinance but rather would
allow some latitude for legitimate exceptions which he believed existed.5 5
Before leaving office in 1969, Mayor Cavanagh made a similar recommendation
suggesting that an amendment to the statute providing police residency ex-
ceptions would be more expeditious and cheaper than lawsuits.
For reasons which are not entirely clear, the council never took action
on such proposals. At the time of Nichols's suggestion, it did consult
Charles Meyer, Chief of the Civil Service Commission. After studying the
court opinions on the residency ordinance's constitutionality and consulting
with the Corporation's Counsel's office, the commission concluded that a change
allowing individual exceptions in special cases would be inconsistent with
the City Charter and therefore illegal. As Meyer pointed out, the Charter
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states (in Title IV, Chapter 4, section 11) that "limitations as to residence
shall be uniform with respect to each job or occupation." 5 6
This opinion most likely had a serious impact on the council. Given the
controversy surrounding the issue, no one was willing to take the political
and legal risks involved in defining a waiver policy which would prevent
arbitrary and excessive exceptions. Thus, the residency trial board pro-
ceedings continued without authority to grant waivers but with responsibility
to order dismissals. Civil service employees challenged the fairness and
effectiveness of the residency review unit because police officers were charged
with the responsibility for disciplining other police. Nonetheless, by
late November 1973, seven officers had been fired for nonresidency and
approximately seventy-five had been charged with violations and were awaiting
trial board action.
In December the board issued a controversial decision in an important
case focusing on the knotty issue of "dual residency." Eugene Caviston,
a sergeant at the time of the original proceedings, was the first of twenty-
one supervisory officers scheduled to be tried for nonresidency. Caviston
and his family had moved from Detroit to Farmington Hills in June 1970 after
the 1969 circuit court ruling invalidating the residency ordinance. When the
Michigan Supreme Court reversed this decision, Caviston sought to satisfy
the residency requirement by renting an apartment in Detroit beginning in
December 1972. His family maintained their suburban home, and he visited
them on weekends.
The board found Caviston guilty of violating the city ordinance based
on its determination that the sergeant's "social life and domestic activity
centered around his family in Farmington Hills rather than his Detroit
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residence."5 9 The board fired Caviston but gave him sixty days to comply
with the residency requirement by moving his family back to Detroit or
divorcing his wife and establishing separate residences.
Caviston's family refused to move to the city. Declaring he would never
believe it was a condition of employment to divorce his wife, Caviston appealed
the decision to the Wayne County Circuit Court. The hearing was delayed in-
definitely. Accordingly, the police department agreed to postpone action on
Caviston's case until the court made its decision. In addition, the seventy-
five nonresidency cases were also adjourned.
The city did not confront the question of retroactive enforcements until
February 1973 when it finally ruled that the ordinance also applied to the
"special waiver" cases. The police department immediately ordered these officers
to move to the city within sixty days or face trial board action. The Lieuten-
ants and Sergeants Association (bargaining agent for police department super-
visory personnel) successfully sought an injunction against the department's
action while it appealed the city's decision. Although a circuit court decision
upheld the city's ruling on retroactive enforcement, in November 1974 the
Michigan Court of Appeals finally held it would be "unreasonable and unconstitu-
tional" to apply the ordinance retroactively. This decision was a welcome win
for the police, for as the next chapter describes, the union was engaged in
still larger battles at this time.
As the dual residency and retroactive enforcement issues illustrated, the
question of police residency enforcements in Detroit was far from settled. The
DPOA successfully exploited these "loopholes" to circumvent the ordinance's




At about the same time the DPOA began its constitutionality chal-
lenge in July 1968 it also filed with the Michigan Employment Relations
Commission (MERC - the agency responsible for administering PERA) an
unfair labor practice complaint against the city. As the union had
threatened to do during the public hearing (see Chapter 1, pp. 13-14),
it charged the city with refusal to bargain in good faith by unilaterally
and without negotiations imposing residency as a condition of employment
for Detroit police.
Although the administrative labor proceedings were being carried on
at the same time as the constitutionality challenge, it was not until
after the decisions of the Michigan and United States Supreme Courts were
issued that the bargaining question received much attention. By this
time, it had reached the courts as an appeal from the MERC proceedings.
The union redirected its resources to this new legal battle. To under-
stand what was involved in the labor challenge, the development of the
matter must be traced from its inception as an unfair labor practice
charge.
MERC - Decision and Order
The problem presented by the union to MERC was stated as follows:
Did the City of Detroit have the duty to bargain with the DPOA,
regarding residency requirements for policemen? If so, did the
City of Detroit violate this duty to bargain by enactment of a
residency ordinance?1l
PERA requires public employers to bargain with representatives of their
employees over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment"
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which the private sector also considers "mandatory" subjects for negotia-
tion. In the public sector, however, the scope of the mandatory bargain-
ing subjects has not been more precisely defined in law, so that it is
often difficult to isolate "terms and conditions of employment" from over-
lapping public policy issues. The DPOA considered residency an unequivocal
condition of employment over which the city was obliged to bargain, a de-
termination originally agreed upon by the city.
In its complaint, the union argued that the Common Council's .failure
to approve the residency agreement made by the mayor and its enactment of
the ordinance breached the city's duty to bargain. The city responded
that it had bargained through its labor relations director, the police
commissioner, and the mayor and that the Common Council's refusal to ratify
the agreement was legitimate. It claimed there are two ratifying author-
ities designated by the City Charter to act - the Common Council and
the mayor. One of the two (the Common Council) legitimately failed to
approve the informal agreement.3 The issue, as stated by the city, pointed
up a general area of confusion in public sector bargaining. Which branch
is the actual employer and which is responsible for bargaining, the ex-
ecutive or the legislative?
The MERC trial examiner reviewing the case, Joseph Bixler, said the
sole issue to be determined was whether negotiations had taken place in
accordance with the bargaining rules mandated by PERA. He commented:
We are not concerned with whether residency is meritorious or not,
but only with the question whether the city has conferred in good4
faith with respect to wages, hours, and conditions of employment.
Bixler stressed this point because the city argued in its brief that a
residency requirement has merit, and the union argued that the residency
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ordinance conflicted with PERA.
The trial examiner held neither argument was to the point or had
merit. He claimed that even if, from the city's view, a residency require-
ment were meritorious, it would not excuse the obligation to bargain on
the subject. Bixler likewise disagreed with the DPOA argument that the
city ordinance conflicted with PERA, and therefore PERA, a state statute,
would prevail. He argued that PERA does not diminish the authority of a
Home Rule city, such as Detroit, to act regarding city personnel. However,
it may circumscribe the council's authority by demanding that the city
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to mandatory
bargaining subjects.
According to Bixler, the central problem involved an interpretation
about the authority of the city's negotiators. In the original memorandum
of agreement concerning residency, the parties recognized the Common
Council's power to approve their agreement:
This agreement is contingent upon its adoption as a "package agree-
ment" by the Common Council and ratification by the membership of
the Detroit Police Officers Association.6
Based on this, the trial examiner concluded that the Common Council's re-
jection was legitimate and that the city had not violated its duty to
bargain.
However, Bixler also concluded that the subject matter (residency
requirements) was one that is a mandatory bargaining item. Therefore,
the Common Council would be obliged to negotiate over residency upon future
7
demand by the DPOA. The ouncil's passage of the ordinance did not alter
this conclusion. The examiner repeated that, as stated in the City of
Saginaw, 1969 Labor O)pinions 293, it did not seem proper that a
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legislative body could veto the actions of its authorized negotiators on
principle without discussing the matter with the bargaining agent. He con-
ceded that this course of action might be taxing on the Common Council.
However, he concluded, in a situation such as Detroit's, with a strong
mayor and strong Common Council which has the right to approve or reject
contracts, no other course of action would provide meaningful collective
bargaining .8
Bixler issued his decision in August 1969 and recommended that the
charges be dismissed. The DPOA promptly filed exceptions to the decision.
In accordance with MEIR procedures, the entire case was then reviewed by
the full Employment Relations Commission.
The commission's decision hinged in part upon determining whether the
Common Council was required to bargain directly with the union before a
legitimate impasse was reached. At the time the Detroit residency ordinance
was passed, the public sector, like the private, recognized an employer's
right to take unilateral action after impasse. Based on its conclusion
that an impasse had been reached in the 1968 police bargaining the city
claimed that the Common Council's unilateral passage of the residency
legislation was valid. The DPOA, on the other hand, vigorously denied a
legitimate impasse because the council had failed to bargain directly
10
with the union.
The commission, noting its decision in an earlier case that direct
participation by the municipal governing body was not a condition prece-
11
dent to a bargaining impasse, decided that a bona fide impasse had been
reached in the police labor negotiations when the Common Council rejected
the informal residency agreement. Although the council did not instruct
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the labor relations bureau or the Mayor's Office that it had turned down
the tentative agreement, the commission concluded that such rejection was
implicit in the council's adoption of the residency ordinance, which it
deemed valid.l2
In mid-March 1971 the full commission issued its decision and order,
concurring with Trial Examiner Bixler that the city had not violated PERA.
As Bixler had done, it also ordered that the residency issue be dismissed.
The DPOA was concerned that the passage of the ordinance removed the
question of residency requirements from the arena of collective bargaining.
The commission denied this and repeated that residency requirements are
indeed conditions of employment under PERA. The Common Council could not
13
change that by adoption of an ordinance or by any other means.
Appeals
MERC grievance procedures specify that parties may petition to have
the commission's decision reviewed by the Michigan Court of Appeals. In-
terestingly, it was the city, not the union, which appealed part of the
commission's order, challenging the ruling concerning the bargainability
of residency requirements.
The city claimed that it had erred in originally agreeing that resi-
dency is a condition of work. It maintained that at the time the nego-
tiations began, collective bargaining was new to Detroit and its representa-
tives were naive. The city was now suggesting that residency is a contin-
uing recruiting requirement like minimum height, vision, or good health.1 4
If the court accepted this reclassification, Detroit would be relieved of
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its duty to negotiate over residency in light of MERC's ruling in another
complaint that recruiting requirements are not mandatory bargaining
items. With a favorable ruling on the validity of the residency ordin-
ance secured,the city wanted to eliminate any future possibilities of
having to bargain with the union over changes in the policy.
To the city's delight, the court of appeals reversed MERC on the
bargainability of residency requirements. It based its decision on the
Michigan Supreme Court opinion in DPOA v. City of Detroit, 385 Mich
519 (1971), even though this case did not address any questions concerning
the scope of public sector bargaining (see Chapter 2, p. 29 above). The
appellate court reasoned that because the supreme court upheld the city's
constitutional right to impose residency requirements, the issue was no
longer mandatorily negotiable. The court did not even address the city's
argument concerning the reclassification of residency as a recruiting re-
quirement.
This decision, an unexpected and major setback to the union, was is-
sued in July 1972, only months after the United States Supreme Court rejected
the DPOA's constitutionality appeal. The prospects for the union were
quite bleak. Although the legitimacy of dual residency was still unre-
solved, the only major hope for the DPOA was to appeal this most recent
decision to the Michigan Supreme Court.
On appeal in November 1972, the union argued vehemently that residency
clearly described a condition to which officers were subject if they were
to remain employed by the police department. The requirement was an
absolute one from which there were no exceptions for police. In addition,
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the union claimed that even though the residency ordinance was constitu-
tional, residency requirements were still negotiable under the terms of
19PERA 19
The union pointed out that the duty to bargain does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require either to make a conces-
sion. Fulfillment of the statutory obligation is measured by the good
faith of the parties in conferring with each other rather than by the
results produced or not produced by negotiations. Thus, if the supreme
court held that residency is a negotiable subject, the ordinance would
not be nullified automatically. The net effect would be to place the
issue on the bargaining table along with other items.
In further defense of its new position the city again maintained,
as it had during the constitutionality challenge, that the enactment of
the residency ordinance was fundamental to the basic direction and purpose
of municipal government. It reasoned that passage of the legislation was
not an attempt by the Common Council to regulate or administer municipal
employment but rather an effort to fulfill its responsibility to promote
the public's health, safety, and welfare. The city concluded that such
a policy decision was beyond the scope of bargaining.
MERC also participated in the appeal to the supreme court, although
throughout litigation it sided with neither party. It neither approved nor
disapproved of the ordinance, nor did it have an opinion on the propriety
or impropriety of police residency regulations. Its sole concern was the
administration of PERA. Agreeing with the DPOA that residency was a term
and condition of employment, it held that the requirement was a mandatory
bargaining item under PERA.
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MERC also agreed with the union that a Home Rule city enacting a
valid ordinance is not relieved of its duty to bargain on the subject mat-
ter of that ordinance. The commission noted that although the Michigan Court of
Appeals had affirmed M]ERC's finding that the adoption of the residency
ordinance did not violate PERA, the court's conclusion was based upon its
opinion that the DPOA constitutionality decision (385 Mich 519 (1971))
in some way barred future negotiations over residency. MERC maintained
this conclusion was entirely unwarranted.2 3
At the outset of its discussion, the supreme court clarified its
holding in the 1971 DPOA constitutionality case, specifying that, contrary
to the opinion of the court of appeals, it neither considered nor decided
in that case any question concerning the scope of the duty to bargain.
The decision simply was that the Common Council had the authority to enact
a residency ordinance.2 4
The supreme court defined one of its main tasks to review MERC's
classification of the residency requirement as a mandatory bargaining
subject. The court was not persuaded by the city's argument that a
residency requirement which regulates the conduct of police officers
throughout their years on the police force can be correctly labeled a
"continuing recruiting requirement." It claimed that recruiting require-
ments focus on the point in time at which a candidate is hired and do not
25
continue to regulate employment thereafter. The court noted that
although the city claimed residency was a recruiting condition, it allowed
new officers one year after their appointments to establish city re-
sidence.
Thus, the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed MERC's decision, upholding the
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bargainability of residency rules. Concerning the details of the'1968
passage of the residency legislation, the court also agreed with MERC that
good faith bargaining had taken place and that an impasse situation had
ensued when the proposed agreement was rejected by the Common Council.
Thereafter, unilateral action, namely the passage of the ordinance, was
permissible. The court further concluded, though, that collective bar-
gaining cannot be avoided through the enactment of an ordinance. It spoke
with finality in February 1974 when it said that in future negotiations,
"the city will again be required to bargain in good faith on the residency
requirement if it is proposed as a bargaining issue by the DPOA. 
After a convoluted six-year cycling through various administrative
and judicial channels, the question of the duty to bargain over residency
requirements in Detroit was finally resolved. The DPOA applauded the de-
cision as a major "legal and moral" victory.
1974 Contract Negotiations
The union wasted no time in following up on the court's decision. On
February 20 it formally demanded that the city "meet and bargain in good
faith regarding the residency of police officers."2 8 Other aspects of
the DPOA's noneconomic contract were not scheduled to expire until June
1976. However, expiration of its economic contract was approaching on.
July 1, 1974. During the 1972 police labor negotiations, the union and the
city had made a gentleman's agreement concerning the residency issue. Recog-
nizing that residency could not be properly considered due to the pending
legal challenges, the city agreed that, if the Michigan Supreme Court ruled the
matter negotiable, the union could bring it up when its economic contract
expired in July 1974 rather than waiting for its noneconomic contract to
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run out in 1976. However, the consideration of residency along with
the economic items was to complicate negotiations considerably.
Coupled with its nonresidency demand, the union requested a 9-percent
hike in base pay plus 100-percent compensation for any inflation occurring
through the upcoming year. It also asked for a major series of improve-
ments in the pension plan, health care, and other fringe benefits. Not
including the cost-of-living escalator Gary Lee, DPOA President at this
time, estimated the cost of the package at $8.3 million. City financial
experts estimated the actual cost could easily double the $8-million figure
given the inevitable costs of similar demands from other city employee
30
groups.
As is always the case in public sector labor relations, economic and
political factors significantly influenced the course of the 1974 police
bargaining. During a time of serious economic instability, city officials
regarded the union's nonresidency demand as an irresponsible and offensive
way of avoiding taxes. This resentment was further punctuated by the DPOA's
simultaneous request for wage increases. The city controller and budget
director forecast that even modest pay hikes could not be financed without
layoffs and cuts in services.31
The political importance of residency at this time can hardly be
overstated. A community-based police department was the cornerstone of
Mayor Coleman Young's political philosophy, and police residency was
viewed as a major means for achieving this goal. Elected in November
1973 former State Senator Coleman Young became Detroit's first black mayor.
He defeated former Police Commissioner John Nichols who was fired by
Mayor Roman Gribbs after ignoring suggestions that he resign upon
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announcement of his mayoral candidacy. Nichols's defeat was a disappoint-
ing blow to the DPOA.
Predictably, crime and the police department had been the major cam-
paign issue. While Nichols advocated crime prevention, Young emphasized
law enforcement and police-community relations. He was especially inter-
ested in effecting a black recruitment campaign to reach his goal of a
50:50 ratio between black and white officers.
In addition to his concern with the residency policy as it related
to the police, Young was also sensitive to reservations expressed by
citizens about the perceived consequences of nonresidency for all public
employees. They feared a scenario which started with a massive white
flight to the suburbs. They worried that this would exacerbate an already
depressed housing market and cause real estate values to collapse. Detroit
income taxes would also drop, and the burden of making up the deficit would
fall to the remaining residents, further accelerating the exodus from the
city.
By the time of the 1974 contract negotiations the police residency
question consequently had become a key symbolic issue for both Mayor Young
and the DPOA. To Young's mind, the union's opposition to the residency
rule was an economic and racial slap in the face to the city. From his
perspective, the DPOA challenge raised a fundamental issue of control:
... one of the issues at stake here is who in the hell runs this
city: civilian authority or thepolice. department?3 2
Young felt strongly that the residency rule was a "basic policy question"
and not negotiable:
I'm not surrendering to the DPOA. The Supreme Court won't be nego-
tiating with the DPOA. I will. If Mr. Lee or anyone else thinks
I'm giving this one away, they have another thought coming.3 3
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The DPOA was equally adamant in its demand that the residency rule be
eliminated. The union argued that it should be accorded the basic right
to choice of residence, especially when discretionary residency waivers
were available to members of the civil service. President Gary Lee de-
clared:
It will be very, very difficult to settle this contract without a
clause abolishing the police residency ordinance adopted by the
City Council.3 4
Given the hard-line positions of both sides, most observers expected
the negotiations to end in binding arbitration as all police contracts had
done since 1969 when Michigan passed a compulsory arbitration act for police
35
and fire departments. Indeed, as the weeks progressed the parties were
unable to resolve the residency dispute nor could they agree upon the terms
for a new economic contract. Consequently, 6n June 14, 1974 the DPOA requested
binding arbitration.
Months were to pass before the proceedings finally began. Frustrated
by the deadlock, around 350 off-duty police and their relatives demonstrated
at the City-County Building in late July. In response to the demonstration,
Young reasserted his firm intentions concerning residency:
I gather they're complaining about lack of progress in negotia-
tions. I don't understand that. The city has offered to match the
economic package given to other city workers and the economic package
that the UAW won.
If they want to go beyond that into noneconomic matters, that's
another question. We're not giving up the right to set policy within
the Police Department.3 6
By mid-August Young's police chief, Philip Tannian, announced an end
to the nine-month moratorium in disciplinary action against nonresident
police, which had been invoked in December 1973, in response to the court's
delay over Lieutenant Eugene Caviston's dual residency appeal (see Chapter
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2). Tannian, claiming he had been unaware of the discontinuation of the
residency trial board hearings, reinstituted them as soon as the situation
was brought to his attention, even though still no action had been taken
37
on the Caviston case.
Two factors may have prompted the city's interest in stepping up
nonresidency investigations at this time. The Detroit Free Press had just
disclosed indications that DPOA President Gary Lee, antagonistic to the
mayor, may have been living in a Detroit suburb. Additionally, the dif-
ficulties in negotiations and the likelihood of arbitration may have motivated
Young to try to strengthen the city's bargaining position.
In October the mayor submitted to the union a list of twelve possible
neutral arbitrators to consider for heading the arbitration panel. The
structure and functions of the tripartite body are such that the impartial
chairman is essentially responsible for casting the deciding vote on all
matters. It is assumed that the two representatives will vote on behalf
of their respective parties. The third-party neutral is expected to make
a well-informed decision based on the arguments presented by the opposing
sides. As chairman, he is responsible for writing the opinion and the
order which is binding on both parties and enforceable in circuit court.
Until 1972 the panel had authority to compromise awards. Then a
"last best offer" amendment, applicable only to economic issues, was passed
which specified that the panel must adopt either the city's or the union's
last proposal.39 For example, if the city's last offer on salaries was a
3-percent increase and the union's last proposal was a 9-percent increase,
the panel was required to award either the 3-percent or the 9-percent
suggested increase, but not something between the two. The panel is still
free to make compromise awards on noneconomic issues as it deems proper.
-53-
The chairman has the authority to remand any items to the parties for
further collective bargaining if he considers it beneficial.
With this background in mind, the critical importance of the choice of the
chairman for the police-labor dispute panel becomes apparent. Not only was
he to become the one responsible for choosing between the city's and the
union's salary offers, but in addition, after years of debate among many
parties over the controversial residency issue, this single individual would
now be empowered to establish Detroit's policy on the matter, a decision
with far-reaching consequences for the allocation of the city's resources.
The residency policy has both direct and indirect impacts on such factors
as access to public jobs, income tax revenues, costs of government, and
the quantity and quality of police services.
The new DPOA president, Ron Sexton, rejected Mayor Young's list of
neutral arbitrator candidates, claiming that none of the suggested individ-
uals had sufficient arbitration experience for the important position.
Furthermore, the candidates were all city residents, and the union disagreed
with the choice of a city resident as the impartial chairman. Accordingly,
it also offered its own list of third-party neutrals for consideration.
By November the other two panel members had been chosen. They were
Allan Davis, former Director of the Detroit Labor Relations Department, as
the city's delegate, and Jack Wood, President of the Detroit Building
Trades Council, representing the union. Still unable to agree on a chair-
man, the two parties asked MERC to step in and appoint the neutral arbitrator.
The extreme delicacy of the chairman's role in the police residency.
arbitration complicated and delayed even MERC's choice of a third-party
neutral. The tremendous emotional and political weight attached to the
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issue dictated that a highly experienced and reputable individual be chosen
for the position.
During the delay, the disputed residency issue remained very much
alive and visible. Emotions ran high between the union and the city. Sex-
ton charged that no progress had been made in negotiations because the
city had taken "a fixed and unreasonable position" on economic matters
until the DPOA agreed to surrender the right to bargain residency. Partly
because the history of arbitration settlements in Detroit was very favor-
able to the unions, the city originally tried in the normal course of col-
lective bargaining to "buy off" nonresidency demands with wage increases.
Sexton angrily responded to this tactic:
We do not think we should divorce the two issues, nor do we feel we
should give up one to get the other.4 2
Although this strategy on the part of the city failed with the DPOA, it
eventually succeeded in. the city's negotiations with two other public
safety unions, the police Lieutenants and Sergeants Association (LSA), and
the Detroit Firefighters Association (DFFA).
Toward the end of October 1974 the LSA ratified a new three-year con-
tract which contained an amended residency clause. It stipulated that the
supervisory officers would agree to live in Detroit, but that their agree-
ment would be voided if the residency rule were outlawed. At first the
union rejected the contract because of the residency requirement. Two
weeks later, however, it reversed its position and accepted a new salary
agreement providing for a 5-percent pay increase the first year and 4-
percent increases for each of the next two years. The officers also re-
ceived a cost-of-living increase of 9-percent for the first year and 6-
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percent for each of the two following years,
Besides the usual economic considerations, a major reason the LSA
was willing to trade off nonresidency for higher wages was that, on the
average, the LSA membership is significantly older than that of the DPOA.
Thus, LSA members are more concerned with wages and pensions, and less con-
cerned with trying to raise young children in the city. For the most part,
the LSA members are well established in their Detroit homes and are not
likely to want to move to the suburbs before retirement. In contrast, the
majority of the DPOA members, being younger, are just investing in homes.
For them, the nonresidency demand was even more important than the wage
issue.
Like the lieutenants and sergeants, the Detroit firefighters also
eventually signed a new contract containing an amended residency clause.
In March 1974 the DFFA vowed an all-out fight to end the residency require-
ment for firemen. By January 1975 the firemen reversed their position and
approved a three-year contract providing the same wage increases and cost-
of-living benefits contained in the LSA agreement and extending the city's
residency requirement. Concerning the union's changed position on
residency, DFFA President Earl Berry said:
...problems in the economy forced us to a different position.
We think there is a possibility of wage and price freezes and we
didn't want to be locked out.4
At about the same time the firemen's contract was settled, a chairman
for the pblice dispute panel was finally appointed by MERC. Harry Platt,
a seventy-two-year-old veteran Detroit arbitrator was the Commission's
carefully selected neutral party. MERC agreed with the city on the import-
ance of requiring the chairman be a Detroit resident. Not only was Platt
a lifelong city resident, but he also had earned a national reputation
-56-
as an outstanding arbitrator. Seventeen of his forty years of experience
were spent umpiring disputes between Ford Motor Company and the UAW. In
addition, he headed two presidential commissions to settle railroad labor
crises, arbitrated labor-management disputes in the airline, steel, and
newspaper industries, and in 1974 became the first arbitrator to hear a
baseball contract. He also chaired the Michigan arbitration panel which
in 1971 maintained parity between Detroit policemen and firemen.
Harry Platt certainly had the necessary respectability and clout to
put weight behind a settlement of the controversial residency question.
Nontheless, the case was loaded with political dynamite, and the final




After the long delay, both sides were anxious to begin arbitration.
The disputed wage question and other unresolved economic matters were
submitted along with the residency issue.
The city argued that the residency and wage questions should be con-
sidered simultaneously because police compensation is based on the premise
of twenty-four-hour duty. It claimed that eliminating the residency re-
quirement would create an economic windfall for officers who chose to live
outside the city. On the other hand, Chairman Harry Platt concurred with
the union that the two matters could and should be handled independently.
Midway through the hearings he perceived that the parties could resolve
the economic issues alone, without an order from the panel, so he remanded
these items for further collective bargaining.
The city and the union eventually settled the economic matters them-
selves and signed an agreement retroactive to July 1, 1974 and extending
through June 30, 1977. Although not entirely satisfied the DPOA ultimately
settled for the same salary increases and cost-of-living adjustments the
LSA and DFFA had received. In addition, the parties agreed to extend their
noneconomic contract one year past its June 1976 expiration date. Thus,
they could devote full attention to the residency issue, the only one re-
maining before the panel.
As defined by the panel, the question to be decided was whether the
parties' collective bargaining agreement should contain a requirement that
!
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Detroit police officers be city residents. It conceded this was essentially
legislative public policy which was normally determined by elected officials
unless the Act 312 impasse provisions were applicable.2 In this respect
the panel's authority contrasts sharply with that of the courts which can-
not substitute their judgment for legislative decisions.
The panel, in resolving such a dispute, is instructed to base its con-
clusions on the pertinent factors set forth in Section 9 of Act 312. Those
applicable to this particular case, as decided by the panel, were as follows;
(a) The lawful authority of the employer...
(c) The interest and welfare of the public...
(d) Comparison of the ... conditions of employment of the
employees involved in the arbitration proceeding with...
conditions of employment of other employees performing
similar services and with other employees generally:
(i) In public employment in comparable communities...
(h) Such other factors, not confined to the foregoing,
which are normally or traditionally taken into con-
sideration in the determination of conditions of em-
ployment through voluntary collective bargaining,
mediation, fact-finding, arbitration, or otherwise
between the parties, in the public service or in
private employment.3
The panel was free to uphold the residency rule, to abolish it, or
to devise its own compromise. For the union, any compromise in the resi-
dency dispute would be at least a partial victory, whereas for the city,
any compromise would mean defeat. And everyone, including Harry Platt,
was fully aware that the city's residency policy had become for Detroit's
first black mayor an important issue of control. Because the
DPOA was challenging a long-standing city policy, Platt felt the burden
of proof fell on the union to show that continuing the residency requirement
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was unjustified. At the same time, the city was obliged to justify its
continuation as a reasonable condition of work within the framework of
Act 312.
The panel conducted hearings between February and the beginning of
May 1975. The city was represented by George C. Edwards III, Special Counsel
to the Mayor and Attorney for the City (son of former Detroit Police Com-
missioner George Edwards). Gordon A. Gregory and Nancy Jean Van Lopik,
of the law firm of Gregory, Van Lopik and Higle, represented the DPOA.
Many of the substantive arguments raised during these proceedings
were very similar to those presented during the constitutionality challenge
in 1968-1971. Different: now was the social, economic and political climate.
Thus, the relative importance of certain arguments changed, as did the form
of their presentation in response to the different criteria of the arbitration
forum.
The DPOA Position
Despite the 1971 ruling upholding the validity of the residency ordinance,
the union still maintained that its rights of travel, relocation, and choice
of residence were being unlawfully restricted. The DPOA urged the application
of the "compelling state interest" standard to test the validity of the or-
dinance: a state classification restricting a fundamental right or a sus-
pect classification (e.g., race, sex) creating invidious discrimination is
unconstitutional unless it supports a compelling state interest.5 The courts
must consider if means other than the curtailment of a fundamental right are
available to meet the compelling interest.
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Technically, this standard is stricter than the equal protection
rational basis test which allows classifications in the application of
ordinances as long as they are based on natural distinguishing character-
istics and bear a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation.
(This equal protection test was applied by the Michigan Supreme Court in
deciding the constitutionality of the Detroit residency ordinance [see
Chapter 2].7 )
The union claimed that public employment was not a sufficiently com-
pelling reason to deny police their fundamental rights. It did concede
that the city is justified in desiring that its employees get to work on
time, that police respond quickly to emergency calls, and that residential
location does not interfere with duty performance. However, it maintained
these objectives could be satisfied without requiring police to live within
corporate limits. One suggestion was to allow officers to live within a
twenty-five-mile radius of the City-County Building.
The union offered testimony from several witnesses who enumerated
diverse personal reasons for wanting the freedom to choose their place of
residence. Reasons cited were desires for raising animals, gardening,
location of family and friends, and circumstantial reasons like health,
inheritances, and marital relationships. The DPOA claimed that this myriad
of personal reasons highlighted the fundamental nature of the right to free-
dom of travel and relocation, thereby demonstrating the rationale for re-
peal or relaxation of the residency rule. The union's emphasis on personal
desires as valid reasons for modifying the requirement ontradicted
the civil service criteria which specify that exceptions are only allowed
for work-related reasons.
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The union also cla:Limed that the unique strain of a policeman's work
should be alleviated by allowing him to retire to a peaceful and stable
home during off-duty hours, which might require geographical as well as
psychological distance. To deny police the opportunity for outside resi-
dency could prove counterproductive for both police and city residents
since an officer's inability to escape from his job could seriously affect
his duty performance.
In support of its stress argument, the DPOA relied heavily on expert
testimony from Dr. George L. Kirkham, Assistant Professor of Criminology
at Florida State University, who, it maintained, was uniquely qualified
to testify because of his academic training as a research criminologist
and his first-hand experience in a participant-observation research project.
Kirkham had gone through a law enforcement training program and had served
as a Jacksonville, Florida police officer living in a small inner-city
apartment for approximately five months.
Kirkham testified that he found police work extremely demanding and
that his inability to leave the scene of his job during off-duty hours was
especially frustrating. He concluded that a police officer's performance
could be enhanced by livting outside the city in which he is employed. Ac-
cording to Kirkham:
...[a] residency requirement imposes a clearly unreasonable
psychological and social burden on people [police], a class
of men and women from whom we already demand too much for
far too little.1 0
Kirkham's testimony was supported by two prominent Detroit psychiatrists.
Dr. Bruce Danto maintained that police residency requirements are psycho-
logically objectionable because they can cause an officer to feel he is
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captive in a community where he has become highly stigmatized and is often
the target of hostility. Dr. Edward C. Dorsey claimed that such a re-
quirement has a negative psychological impact on the concept of a "home."
He argued that when the choice of a home is dictated and secondary to one's
job, it becomes something that only serves the biological need for sleep
and nutrition.
In addition to the expert testimony, the DPOA claimed there is ample
evidence from working police officers that choice of residence relieves
stress and tension. Carl Parsell, former president of the DPOA, and Los
Angeles police officer Antonio Amador both testified to this effect based
on their own experiences. The union also cited a study, "Job Stress in
Policemen," conducted by the National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health which concluded and recommended:
Thus, police work becomes one of the few jobs which has
a potent adverse effect on the total life of the worker.
That is, the policeman's job affects his own personal
social life, his family's social life, his children's
perception of him as a father, etc.... So, from the point
of view of the effective functioning of the police depart-
ment, as well as the effective functioning of the police-
men, serious attempts at reduction of specific job stres-
sors are warranted.1 3
Comparing other jurisdictions, the union pointed out that only three
of the ten largest cities other than Detroit (Chicago, Philadelphia, and
Indianapolis) still require residency within city limits. The remaining
seven cities have variations including no rule,' reasonable distance, con-
tiguous counties, and a mile radius. In Michigan itself some smaller towns
and cities have abolished or modified their residency rules.
The union called attention to the fact that Wayne County employees
are permitted to live within the "Detroit Metropolitan Area" which includes
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several counties. Eugene C. Mathivet, Jr., Director of the Wayne County
Civil Service Commission for approximately twenty-five years, cited the
traditional civil service philosophy underlying a liberal residency rule:
the largest possible pool of applicants will yield the greatest number
of qualified candidates from which to make the best selection of employees.l5
The county residency rule, the union further argued, is more consistent
with the notion of a Detroit metropolitan area and emerging concepts of
regionalization embodied by organizations such as SEMTA (Southeast Michigan
Transit Authority) and SEMCOG (Southeast Michigan Council of Governments).16
"Other factors" mentioned by the union in support of eliminating the resi-
dency rule were savings from costs of residency investigations and litigation
and the retention of trained personnel who would quit without the basic
right to choice of residence. Although the DPOA bore the burden of proving
the unreasonableness of the residency requirement, it only introduced two
major arguments -- the rights to travel, migration, and choice of residence
and the right of relief from stress -- to support its position. The rest
of its case consisted primarily of rebutting the city's arguments and will
be discussed in more detail in the following section. The union's general
charge was that the city had failed to prove its allegations that:
1. A "mass exodus" of police officers from the city would
occur if the residency rule were relaxed or abolished.
2. The city would suffer irreparable financial damage due
to lost income and property tax revenues if police of-
ficers moved to the suburbs.
j. Continuation of the residency requirement is necessary
for stable community relations.
4. Police department operational considerations (such as
twenty-four-hour duty and emergency mobilization)
necessitate continuation of the requirement.
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5. Off-duty officers living in Detroit have a major de-
terrent effect on crime.
6. Cities with police residency requirements have better
law enforcement and community relations than the ma-
jority of cities which either have no rules or modi-
fied requirements.
7. The residency issue is a matter of real concern or
importance for Detroit citizens.1 7
The City Position
From the city's point of view, the major question to be decided was not
simply whether a police officer is entitled to choose his place of residence,
but whether an individual may live where he wishes and at the same time in-
sist upon government employment. The city argued emphatically (and cor-
rectly) that no such right to public employment is expressed in
the U.S. Constitution, nor have the courts created such a substantive right.
The city stressed the point that the constitutionality of the residency
requirement was not an issue before the panel. It claimed this matter was
firmly resolved by both the Michigan and United States Supreme Courts. It
interpreted the U.S. Supreme Court's dismissal of the DPOA case for want of a
substantial federal question as tantamount to a decision on the merits that
the ordinance does not violate either the right to due process or of equal
protection. To buttress this conclusion, the city cited Ahern v. Murphy,
457 F2d 363 (7th Cir 1972), in which a Chicago policeman challenged the
constitutionality of a Chicago residency ordinance. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, in dismissing the case, found the U.S. Supreme Court's
dismissal of the DPOA appeal (see Chapter 2) not merely persuasive, but,
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indeed, "dispositive" of the matter:
Although it is well established that the denial of a
petition for writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court
carries no precedential weight whatever,...the dismissal
of an appeal for want of a substantial federal question
stands on an entirely different basis. It is a decision
on the merits of the case appealed.2 0
The city pointed out that several other courts throughout the country
have also upheld residency ordinances and state statutes on the grounds that
they have legitimate and rational purposes and further compelling state
interests. It made special note of Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F Supp 492
(D NJ 1972), in which the court applied the stricter "compelling state
interest" test, not the rational basis test, in a suit on behalf of police
and firefighters challenging a similar residency requirement.
Balancing the constitutional rights of the public safety workers to
travel and migrate against the interests of the city, the Krzewinski court, echoing
the Detroit police case, found three compelling reasons it felt legitimated
the residency restriction. In light of the New Jersey riots, the court
concluded the rule was important to help improve police-community relations.
Additionally, it recognized the deterrent effect of off-duty police and the
value of chance associations and encounters resulting from local residence,
which led to important sources of information. In considering the popular
contention that police should reside in the cities to respond quickly to
emergencies, the court concluded that the state could satisfy this interest,
not by an infringement of a fundamental right, but alternatively, as proposed
by the DPOA, by the use of time or distance computations.
The city acknowledged that the rights of travel, migration, and choice
of residence had been upheld on constitutional grounds in other cases, but
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it pointed out that the facts and circumstances were vastly different from
the police residency case. Among other things, most of these cases involved
and invalidated durational residency requirements (requirements that an in-
dividual maintain the status of a resident for a minimum period of time before
he is eligible for certain benefits or services).
The city concluded that not only is the Detroit residency requirement
valid, but also its continuation is constitutionally mandated, albeit in-
directly, to avoid the promotion of de facto residential segregation. It
argued that the requirement is no less justified for police than for other
city employees. To the contrary, it claimed there are a number of rational
reasons particularly applicable to police (e.g. list pp. 63-64, nos. 3-6)- that make
the requirement even more important for them than for general city employees.
The city claimed elimination of the residency rule would have catas-
trophic social and economic consequences. The expected flight of middle-
class whites from Detroit would result in a loss of tax revenues and thereby
the city's fiscal balance would deteriorate. This would necessitate layoffs
and lead to a simultaneous increase in demands for more and better services
within the city. These concerns, along with the police department operational
considerations, were the major issues discussed by the city in addressing
the impact of police residency on the public interest.
Among the operational considerations, the city placed heavy emphasis on
the need for quick mobilization in emergencies. Officials wanted to ensure
the immediate availability of police during civil disturbances such as the
1967 riot and the 1968 assassination of Martin Luther King.
The DPOA rebutted that an officer living in a suburb may actually be
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living closer to his station than if he lived in certain areas of the city,
particularly since officers are not required to live in their assigned beats,
In fact, the distribution of police residences throughout the city is heavily
skewed to the northeast and northwest regions referred to as "Copper Canyon"
for this reason.
The city conceded that some officers with suburban homes may be closer
to their work than if they lived in certain parts of Detroit. As a general
rule, however, it claimed more officers would be nearer to their duty stations
if they all lived in the city.
The DPOA also argued that situations necessitating full mobilization
are rare. It noted that the troubles of 1967 and 1968 were the only times
in over twenty-eight years that the police force had been completely mo-
bilized. (Ironically, on the night of July 28-29, 1975, only days before
the union submitted its post-hearing brief, a civil disturbance erupted in the
city which required a modified police mobilization. This involved calling
shifts in early and holding others late. At this time, no special mention
was made of the speed of response, although an estimated ninety-three officers
were believed to be living outside Detroit. 6)
The union also objected to the city's argument that the residency re-
quirement is necessary to uphold the twenty-four-hour duty policy. As it
had done during the constitutionality case, the DPOA challenged the effec-
tiveness of round-the-clock duty by pointing out that no empirical evidence
exists to support the relationship between off-duty police action and law
enforcement. The police department does not compile statistics pertaining
to the frequency of off-duty activities. Contrary to the city's belief,
the union claimed police not on duty are wary of performing law enforcement
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functions lest they be sanctioned by the department for improper conduct., 7
In contrast, Police Chief Tannian testified about three occasions when
his off-duty interactions helped maintain community peace. Based on other
similar experiences, the city claimed an officer's mere presence in a com-
munity resulted in a degree of trust and familiarity with neighbors which
opened new sources of information and led to off-duty arrests. It argued
that the chief's experiences, multiplied by the number of police officers,
provided a compelling social rationale for continuing the residency re-
quirement.2 8 The city concluded that in this way the rule contributes sig-
nificantly to neighborhood stability. In response, the union claimed'that
resident officers run the risk of losing some of their effectiveness as a
result of overidentification with the community.2 9
Lacking hard data concerning the number of off-duty arrests or assists
made, the administration tried to support its case by introducing a series
of maps and charts intended to show that crime rates are lower in neighbor-
hoods where large numbers of police live. The city pointed out that in 1974
"Copper Canyon" in the 16th precinct had the lowest crime rate in the city even
though it was the second most heavily populated, which "...demonstrates that
the continuing presence within the community of police officers, even those
off duty, acts as a significant deterrent to crime."
In arriving at this conclusion, the city did not argue a direct casual
relationship between police presence and reduced crime. The situation des-
cribed was more complicated. Officials feared if police and thousands of
other municipal employees moved outside Detroit, income levels would drop
and racial balance would deteriorate even further. Since crime is higher
in neighborhoods having lower median incomes and higher percentages of blacks,
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the city assumed it would spread were the residency stipulation completely
eliminated. 31
Attacking the city's charts and conclusions, the union pointed out that
an examination of rates of increase as opposed to overall crime rates revealed
a different picture. Although the 15th and 16th "Copper Canyon" precincts
have among the lowest overall crime rates, crime is increasing more rapidly
in these areas than in all but two of the city's eleven other precincts.
While crime increased citywide in 1974 by 15.8 percent over 1973, it in-
creased 21,8 percent in the 15th northeastern precinct and by 21.1 percent in
the 16th northwestern precinct. Especially in light of the inherent biases
and inaccuracies of reported crime rates, the union argued that a consideration
of the reasons for crime or lack of it should take into account a variety of
factors including race, income, median income, geographical area, population,
and home value.
Overall, then, it is virtually impossible to evaluate independently the
impact of residency in deterring crime. Most likely, the city'sreal concern
over the twenty-four-hour duty requirement was not so much its actual deterrent
effect on crime but rather its perceived impact: fearful middle-income resi-
dents would derive a sense of security by the mere presence of police. The
city feared that a loss of this feeling would contribute greatly to the re-
maining middle-class residents' loss of confidence in Detroit, thus en-
couraging their flight to the suburbs.
In addition, the city argued that police salaries reflect the special
risks and responsibilities inherent in the twenty-four-hour duty requirement.
In previous arbitrations, it pointed out, the DPOA had argued for and was
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granted higher wages based partially on this logic. Thus, the city claimed
eliminating the residency requirement would provide an economic windfall for
officers choosing to live outside the city because they would be paid for
twenty-four-hour service they were not giving to Detroit citizens. The police
denied that their salaries included special compensation for round-the-clock
duty, as evidenced by their wage parity with firefighters who are not techni-
cally on call twenty-four hours a day.3 5
Addressing another aspect of the relationship between police salaries
and the residency rule, Coleman Young expressed considerable resentment
when he said:
Here we are with one of the highest paid police depart-
ments in the nation and one of the worst school systems
in the area. Police want the best of both -- high salaries
and suburban residency to support rich schools.3 6
Young's attitude was that "if the city isn't good enough to live in, then
it's too good to work in."3 7 He felt strongly that a residency requirement
gives officers a "commonality of interests" -- that is, an officer living in
and paying taxes to the city would be motivated by a personal stake in the
community.
The mayor also claimed the residency rule would improve police-community
relations, a topic receiving considerable attention throughout the proceedings.
Young argued that the need to develop better understanding between police
and the community was among the most compelling reasons for the residency
policy. Although the union also acknowledged this need, it maintained the
way to achieve interaction and understanding between police and citizens was
not with a residency rule, but through increased use of foot patrols and team
policing. The city, on the other hand, agreed with the riot commissions
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and task force reports which recommended reducing hostility between white
police and urban blacks by recruiting a higher proportion of black officers
to more accurately reflect their racial mix in the inner-city population.
During the time the residency ordinance was passed and its constitution-
ality challenged, an alleged police department personnel shortage was among
the major union arguments for repealing the legislation. The shortage occurred
just after the civil disturbances of 1967 and 1968, and the union claimed
the department was having difficulty recruiting qualified applicants (see
Chapter 2, n. 33).
By 1974-75 the situation was reversed. The depressed economy made police
jobs more attractive because of their decent pay and relative security. The
availability of federal funds encouraged minority recruitment, and entrance
requirements, such as height and education, had been modified by changes made during
the Cavanagh administration to urge more police candidates. The department was
now receiving far more qualified applicants than it could afford to hire.
In 1974 the department received 10,585 applications: 3,787 white and 6,798
black.39 Of these 450 were deemed qualified candidates.40 However, due to
budgetary constraints, the department was only able to hire 274 new officers:
143 white and 131 nonwhite. This still left the department below its
authorized strength, not because of an inadequate pool of qualified candidates,
but because of insufficient hiring funds. Thus, the city concluded it was
meaningless to argue that elimination of the residency requirement would
result in more applicants since no benefits would be derived to the depart-
ment from having to reject even more candidates.
In light of restrictions on hiring and institutional barriers to black
employment, Coleman Young claimed that abolishing the residency rule would
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destroy any future possibilities of having a truly representative police force.
At the beginning of 1975 more than 50 percent of Detroit's population was
black, but over 80 percent of the city's police were white. Commenting on
the low proportion of black officers in the nation's major cities Young said:
.. I think we ought to lay this thing right on the line.
We're dealing with a racial situation here. We are dealing
with racial problems. 4 3
The question before us after all these years of talking
about people's police departments is this: As the black
people take over and begin to control the community, are
we going to change the rules?4 4
He went on to insist, "There is no more important issue facing the people of
this city -- and indeed the people of this nation -- than the issue of police
residency."4 5 Emphasizing the objections of the blacks to being ruled by
a "white army of occupation" the mayor declared:
No black community is going to stand to be pushed
around by a predominantly white police department
that doesn't even have enough respect for the community
to live in the city.4 6
Thus, city officials maintained that eliminating the residency require-
ment would increase tension between blacks and white police. The ramifications
would heighten the likelihood of physical danger to police. In short, the
city concluded that stress would be intensified rather than relieved by
abolishing the residency rule.4 7
The administration further challenged the validity of the union's stress
argument by bringing in Professor Jerome Skolnick (Chairman of the Center for
the Study of Law and Society at the University of California at Berkeley) to
criticize the methodology and conclusions of DPOA witness Dr. George Kirkham.
Skolnick testified that Kirkham's analysis was unsound -- he generalized from
a personal situation which was not applicable to most other police. In
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particular, Skolnick criticized the artificial stress introduced into Kirk-
ham's personal life during his experience as a police officer by his separation
from his pregnant wife and children. Furthermore, his prior experience had
not prepared him for living in a small apartment in a deteriorating inner-
city neighborhood.4 8
In concluding its arguments on operational considerations, the city also
mentioned a few more mundane ways officers' nonresidency would hamper the
police department's efficient administration. It claimed that suburban police
residency would increase costs of verifying illnesses at officers homes and
49
of delivering notification of duty-related deaths and disabilities. The
union responded that any extra operational costs would be more than offset
by savings on residency investigations which had cost the city $670,000 in
a two-and-a-half-year period.5 0
Based on his experience as Chief of Police in New York City, former
Detroit Commissioner Patrick Murphy suggested another way police nonresidency
might impair the department's effectiveness: a suburban officer dependent
on scheduled public transit or car pools might be reluctant to make arrests
at the end of his shift for fear of missing a ride home.51 (The department
ignored this same possibility for resident officers who live at one extreme
of the city and work in another.) In summary, the city reasoned that the
above-mentioned operational factors promoted the public interest by improving
the police department's administration and contributing to its efforts in
deterring crime.
Social and economic conditions in 1975 made the city's financial and
racial arguments even more compelling than they had been when the ordinance
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was passed. Officials were extremely concerned about Detroit's population
loss of more than a half-million people in the past twenty-five years, During
the same period the percentage of blacks in the city has jumped from 16 to
more than 50 percent. Meanwhile, the suburbs have been growing as quickly
as Detroit has been declining, contributing to the development of a metro-
politan region with a largely black urban center and largely white suburban
52
ring.
The administration in its racial and economic arguments assumed that
eliminating the residency rule would cause a "mass exodus" of white employees,
It claimed the persistency with which the DPOA had challenged the residency
rule suggested that large numbers of officers wanted to leave Detroit, In
an attempt to predict the size of the exodus, an outside planning consultant
was hired to interpret the data on population trends and job distributions
which the City Planning Department had prepared.
Planner Yale Rabin's analysis of Detroit's population loss supported the
city's presumption that a large number of police would move as soon as con-
venient if given the chance. According to Rabin the past annual rate of de-
parture of Detroit's white citizens had been approximately 4-5 percent.5 3
He claimed the residency restrictions had created a situation of "pent-up
demand" for relocation that would amount to 20 percent of white city em-
ployees leaving during the first year after relaxation of the residency rule,
Following the release of "pent-up demand" he predicted a decline to the
4-5 percent annual departure rate. Rabin intentionally made his estimates
in terms of all city employees because he assumed removal of residency re-
strictions for police would make it impossible to maintain such rules for
other city workers.
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Objecting that the departure estimates should have been restricted to
DPOA members, the union challenged the accuracy of Rabin's projections. It
claimed the city planner's "pent-up demand" argument was exaggerated in re-
gard to police. The union noted that about 89 percent of police are home
owners. The tight economy and the high costs of home mortgages would inhibit
their movement. Furthermore, the "pent-up demand" of police had already been
relieved to a certain extent due to an estimated ninety-three officers living
outside the city at the time of the hearings. 5 5
Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that Rabin's figures were
accurate, the DPOA estimated that, at most, within a year after the elimination
of the residency rule, 600 white police officers (3,000 [low estimate white
DPOA members] x 20 percent) would move. The next year approximately 100
(2,400 x 4.5 percent) would leave and less each year thereafter.56 The union
claimed this could hardly be characterized a mass exodus.
In another attempt to quantify the expected employee departure the city
paid Market Opinion Research, Inc. $7,000 to conduct a survey of residency
attitudes among Detroit's public safety officers. 5 7 In early November 1974,
the firm interviewed a random sample of 500 police officers, firefighters,
and their spouses from the city's 7,019 public safety households.5 8
Overall the survey results showed little difference in attitudes be-
tween firemen and policemen but reflected significantly divergent views among
blacks and whites. The findings reinforced Mayor Young's position that resi-
dency is largely a racial issue. Three out of four persons interviewed said
they did not favor residency rules. Only 24 percent of blacks expressed this
view as compared with 83 percent of the whites. Fifty-three percent of the
total respondents said hey would choose to move outside the city if the
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residency rule were lifted. This attitude was shared by 60 percent of the
whites and only 13 percent of the blacks. Extrapolating from these figures,
the city estimated 3,700 public safety officers and their families would
choose to live outside Detroit were the residency rule abolished.60
The union complained that the inclusion of firefighters and supervisory
police made the sample of white DPOA members too small to yield reliable
statistical results. It objected that lieutenants and sergeants biased the
findings because their higher incomes offer greater opportunities to move.
Being older, they have had more time to accumulate assets and are also be-
ginning to contemplate retirement. The union also contended that firemen
are more interested in outside residency than police although statistics
did not bear out this conclusion. Moreover, the police claimed inaccurate
responses resulted from conditional questions which attempted to gauge
preferences for moving rather than actual intent.6 1
Coleman Young admitted that some middle-income black officers, as well
as white, probably wanted to move from Detroit. He identified the city's
problem as one of class, not only race. According to Young, the city could
not sustain the direct loss of income tax revenue or the indirect loss of
commercial activity which would result if many middle-income residents moved.
He emphasized that economic considerations necessitated a residency require-
ment for all city employees, not only police.
To help document the mayor's claims City Finance Director Dennis Green
testified to the precariousness of Detroit's financial situation. He pro-
jected a $91-million deficit for fiscal year 1974-75. For the first time in
public, Green predicted the only realistic means to reduce this deficit was
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to lay off large numbers of city employees and cut back services.62
Given its unstable financial situation, the city expected to receive
police service, not abandonment, for the price it paid in salaries and fringes.
The police department was already receiving about 27.5 percent of the total
city budget. The city anticipated a $19-million increase for police and
fire pension contributions in addition to an increase in wages. According
to actuarial estimates, the city's contribution rate in fiscal year 1975-76
would be around 56 percent of each police and fire salary dollar, as com-
pared with an average rate of 17 percent for other city employees.6 5
Having presented this general background, the city then addressed the
direct and indirect economic impacts of relaxed residency. It relied heavily
on Wayne State economist Dr. John Mattila who maintained that the overall economic
impact of the police movement could be measured by a "multiplier effect" which,
in this case, would be double the income of each family. The union questioned
the multiplier's accuracy and Mattila's assumption about the amount of resi-
dent income spent in Detroit. Nonetheless, using the old average income
of $15,500 for public safety officers, Mattila predicted if 3,700 (the Market
Opinion Research departure figure) such employees left the city, the annual
loss to Detroit would be $114.7 million. Using the lower figure of 3,000 white
DPOA families, he estimated the impact would be $93 million.6 7
The city claimed eliminating the police rule would have a domino effect
for all other municipal employees. Using an average annual salary of $11,500,
Matilla projected an additional $115-million loss if 5,000 city workers moved
immediately.
The DPOA again objected that the city's estimated economic losses were
overstated because they were based on exaggerated projections of employee
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departures. As previously mentioned, the union claimed not more than 600 police
families would leave the city if given the opportunity (see page 75 above). Conse-
quently, the city's lowest financial loss estimate ($93 million) should be re-
duced proportionately to reflect a more realistic figure. This would yield a
total loss to the economy of $18.6 million (one-fifth of $93 million).69
The union also argued that the city's estimated departure of 5,000 general
city employees was inflated because it ignored testimony that 53 percent of
the civil service employees were minorities. Several witnesses, including
Rabin, predicted that only a small number of blacks would move if residency
rules were eliminated. Taking this into account, the union claimed abin's
5,000 figure should be reduced to 3,000 at most. Using this estimate the
projected effect on the economy would be a $69 million loss.
These DPOA estimates totaled an $87.6 million loss ($18.6 million from
police and $69 million from other municipal employees). The union admitted
that, standing by itself, this figure seemed to indicate a substantial impact.
However, considered in the context of the entire economy, the figure indicated
quite another picture. The 1972 Census of Business revealed that the total
Detroit economy, excluding manufacturing, was $10.17 billion. The $87.6-million
figure was only eight-tenths of one percent of the economy, excluding manu-
facturing. The $18.6 million which pertained exclusively to DPOA members
was less than two-tenths of one percent of the economy. The union concluded
this is de minimis in view of the city's overall economic situation.7 1
The city also claimed losses in its own revenues if police established
outside residency. Dennis Green, Detroit's finance director, described the
city budget's revenue sources. He identified city income taxes, property
taxes, and state and federal revenue-sharing as areas affected by population
movements.
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Local tax revenues have declined steadily over the past several years
despite the fact that Detroit property and income taxes are higher than in
any other Michigan municipalities. He attributed much of this revenue loss
to the heavy migration of middle- and upper-income families and the resulting
reduction in total assessed value of real property. The union countered
that if officers moved from their Detroit homes, the real property would re-
main to be taxed. This, however, ignored the probability of abandonment
and its impact on real estate values. Green pointed out that since 1969:
... there have been 17,000 residential properties torn
down in the City of Detroit. The assessed value of those
17,000 properties is some $98 million. That represents,
to the City of Detroit in taxes, $7.6 million...Last year,
there were only 15 building permits in the City of Detroit
for residential construction. It is going down at an annual
rate of $6 million in assessed valuation. So our property
taxes are declining because of the abandonment of proper-
ties.7 4
Green's testimony was supported by that of Robert Knox, real estate broker
and former Detroit housing commissioner who agreed that if 3,700 houses
were put on sale, the housing market would be further depressed, and
property tax collections would be deflated.7 5
The DPOA maintained there should be no problem regarding the income
tax. It agreed that if its officers were allowed to live outside Detroit
and chose to do so, they would voluntarily contribute to the city the 1.5
76
percent difference between the resident and the nonresident tax. How-
ever, the city challenged the legality and binding nature of this voluntary
agreement.
The potential impact of population departure on state and federal
revenue-sharing was more difficult to estimate. Federal revenue-sharing
computations are based on a three-part formula which takes into account tax
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effort, property level, and population. Given the ambiguity of the available
information, the union argued its case in terms of per capita effect, basing
its calculations on Green's own testimony that approximately $86.49 million
of operating budget revenues came from "grants, share taxes, and federal
revenue sharing." 77For Detroit's 1.5 million population, this comes to $57
per capita. Thus, if 600 police families of four persons each left the city,
the loss would only be $136,800, an inconsequential amount compared with the
$91-million deficit predicted for the 1975-76 fiscal year.
On balance, the DPOA admitted that a relatively small population movement
would have some economic effect, but it would be de minimis in terms of the
total economy and budget of the city. It concluded that Detroit's financial
problems could not be solved by imprisoning its employees.
In keeping with the traditional bargaining spirit, Harry Platt believed
in the necessity and merits of compromise. At one point during the proceedings,
he requested that both parties consider and submit possible compromise solutions.
The union offered the two previously described proposals -- residency within
a twenty-five-mile radius of the City-County Building and a voluntary agree-
ment for nonresident police officers to pay the 2-percent resident income tax.
The city, on the other hand, refused to consider any compromises and maintained
a strict residency position.
During Mayor Young's testimony, Platt raised the possibility of again
granting the power for discretionary residency waivers to the police chief.
Young was vigorously opposed. He feared that once the door was opened to
exceptions, it would be impossible to close it again. Commenting on problems
with enforcement, due process, and legal challenges, the mayor objected that
responsibility for such decisions would impose an unfair burden on the police
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chief, especially in light of existing tensions and strained morale in the
department. Moreover, for Young, a major issue at stake was control over
the police department. He was determined to have his administration exercise
complete authority.
Thus, the city refused to relax its rigid stance. As one observer com-
mented, Young and Edwards had narrowed the bargaining position of their panel
representative, Allan Davis, "to something smaller than a needle's eye."8 1
Opinion and Award
Four months and 2,000 pages of testimony after they began, the hearings
were completed in early May. At the beginning of August the parties filed
extensive post-hearing briefs. The decision, finally reached on September 5,
1975, upheld the Detroit residency requirement without modification. Accor-
ding to practice, the opinion and findings were written by the chairman,
Harry Platt. The other two panel members were not required to agree com-
pletely with the order and award, and in fact, Jack Wood, the union's delegate,
refused to sign it.
Platt was well aware of the national significance of his decision
which was the first time the controversial matter of police residency was
settled for a major city through compulsory arbitration. He began by ad-
dressing the city's lawful authority to impose residency requirements which,
he believed, warranted special attention in view of the extensive litigation
on the issue between the city and the union, other similar litigation through-
out the country, and the DPOA's continued insistence that police were being
unlawfully denied their fundamental rights.
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The chairman agreed with the city that its OWnrlt'Itlttional authority
to enact a residency ordinance was settled by the Miclhigan Supreme Court
in DPOA v. City of Detroit, 385 Mich 519 (1971). Ilt also agreed that the
United States Supreme Court's dismissal of the DPOA', appeal for want of a
substantial federal question had the force of a decision on the merits and
affirmed the findings of the Michigan Supreme Court.8 2
In addition, Platt was heavily persuaded by the fact that other state
and federal courts have cited the Michigan case with approval and even quoted
its language. Besides Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F Su)pp 492 (D NJ 1972) which
upheld a New Jersey police and firemen's statute (seo page 65 above), he was
convinced by the court's opinion in Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi
506 F 2d 900 (1975). The Wright court rejected the "compelling state interest"
test adopted by the Krzewinski court and instead used the equal protection
rational basis standard, as the Michigan court had done in the DPOA case,
385 Mich 519 (1971). Citing the Detroit Case with approval, the Wright court
furthermore quoted a California Supreme Court opinion summarizing numerous
"rational purposes [for residency rules] advanced in vrious adjudicated cases:"
Among the governmental purposes cited in th(ese decisions ...
are the promotion of ethnic balance in the community; re-
duction in high unemployment rates of innl-city minority
groups; improvement of relations between uch groups and
city employees; enhancement of the quality of employee
performance by greater personal knowledge of the city's
conditions and by a feeling of greater per;rnal stake
in the city's progress; diminution of abs;ent:eeism and
tardiness among municipal personnel; ready availability
of trained manpower in emergency situati.otnl;; and the
general economic benefits flowing from locall expenditure
of employees' salaries. Ector v. City of Torrance, 10
Cal 3d 129, 54P 2d (1973).83
Thus, Platt concluded there was no question of Dtroit's lawful authority
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to require police residency. The issue to be determined was;
...whether it: is reasonable and justifiable for the City
to insist upon the exercise of this right [to impose
residency requirements] as a part of the total collective
bargain between it and the Association.8 4
Platt did not believe the duty to bargain necessarily required the city to
abandon a longstanding condition of employment it considered fair and
necessary. The case hinged on determining whether the public interest
was better served by police living inside or outside the city. In seeking
an answer, the chairman evaluated the impact of residency on three areas --
police department operations, economic considerations, and community relations.
Platt agreed, as the city had argued, that the residency rule is necessary
for the police department's efficient operation which serves the public in-
terest by contributing to prudent use of tax dollars and promoting crime con-
trol efforts. He considered the relationship of residency to the twenty-four-
hour duty policy most important. Acknowledging the lack of hard data concerning
the frequency of off-duty arrests, Platt was nonetheless persuaded by Chief
Tannian's testimony and the city's arguments (see p. 68 above) that round-
the-clock police presence helps to deter crime. Furthermore, he agreed
with the city that eliminating the residency rule would create an economic
windfall for nonresident officers (see pp. 69-70).85
The chairman also gave considerable weight to the importance of emergency
mobilizations reasoning that, as a general proposition, the department's
response capabilities would be greater if all police lived in Detroit.
He did comment that the DPOA's proposal for residency within a twenty-five
mile radius would be preferable to an unrestricted policy. However, he
felt it would still place some officers further from their duty stations
than if the requirement were continued.
AI'
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As a native of Detroit, Platt was very aware of the city's precarious
financial situation. In trying to evaluate the impact of relaxed residency
on city revenues, he conceded it was impossible to predict the exact size
of the population movement but concluded it would be sizeable given the duration
and depth of the DPOA's commitment to the struggle against the requirement.
Platt believed his assumption was supported, though not necessarily proved,
by the testimony of City Planner Yale Rabin, and he gave credence to the
results of the Market Opinion Research survey despite the flaws noted by
the DPOA. The Chairman agreed with the city that were residency abolished
for police, it would be virtually impossible to maintain the rule for fire-
fighters and other city employees.
Assuming a reasonably large population movement, Platt concluded that
the city would suffer serious direct and indirect economic consequences as
a result. Although the precise dimensions of the consequences could not
be estimated, they would not be de minimis as argued by the DPOA and could
not be ignored. He was especially concerned about the likely loss in general
economic and commercial activity which would undermine the confidence of
businessmen, investors, and the general public.
Platt shared the city's reservations about the legality and binding
nature of the DPOA's voluntary proposal for nonresidents to pay the 2-percent
resident income tax. City Attorney Edwards had commented on a similar offer
made to New York City by the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association (PBA). After
the administration had accepted the proposal, the PBA sued New York to lift
the tax provision. Among the other concerns raised by the city of Detroit
were the following:
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Should there be recalcitrant employees who refuse to
"execute appropriate forms" what procedure is available
to the City to enforce collection? Must the City sue
in civil court under the bargaining contract? May the
City terminate the employment of an offender found to
be living outside the City and refusing to execute the
proper forms? If so, may this termination take place
outside the grievance procedure?8 8
Platt held that even could the proposal be adopted and enforced, it would
at best only be a partial solution to the overall economic problems resulting
from the residency rule's abolition. Accordingly, he rejected the DPOA's
offer.
In assessing the impact of residency on law enforcement, Platt recog-
nized the conventional wisdom that effective police work in metropolitan
areas is dependent upon good police-community relations. He was persuaded
by the city that police residency would improve community relations by
increasing an officer's knowledge of and sensitivity to community needs.
In addition, a residency policy would encourage minority recruitment which,
in turn, would help reduce hostility and distrust between black citizens
and white police. His conclusion was strongly influenced by the Report of
the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders and testimony by Pro-
fessors Skolnick and Albert J. Reiss, Jr. (Professor of Sociology at the
Institute for Social Policy Studies and Lecturer in Law at Yale University)
who both stated that eliminating the requirement would heighten stress and
hostility.89
The only DPOA argument addressing how nonresidency would promote the
public interest was that the consequent reduction of stress and improvement
in morale would enable police to perform their jobs better, Platt said he
...has the highest possible appreciation and respect for
the risks and responsibilities inherent in modern police
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work, and shares the Association's opinion that every-
thing possible must be done, consistent with the public
interest, to reduce the stress which officers undeniably
90
experience.
However, he was unconvinced that merely going home to a suburban residence
at night would make a significant difference. Stress was most often a
consequence of a police officer's on-the-job experiences, training, moti-
vation and attitude toward the job. Platt reasoned it unlikely that any
of these factors would be improved by the mere geographical relocation of
an officer's home and felt, as the city had, that nonresident officers
might experience more stress as a result of decreased citizen cooperation
and increased hostility.
.The DPOA had argued that the city had misidentified the source of com-
munity tension and hostility by describing it in racial terms. The union
had claimed the real conflict was between criminals and law-enforcement
agents and further had suggested the city's entire community relations
argument was inherently political. As such, it had no proper place in the
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aribtration proceedings. In response to this charge Platt declared;
No doubt the issue does have political overtones, but
this is virtually unavoidable in view of the manner in
which it has been thrust into public view through the pro-
tracted legal challenges to the residency requirement and
other court actions. Indeed, some would say that the en-
tire question of race relations in the City of Detroit, of
which hostility between black citizens and the white police
officers is only one aspect, is political in character.
But, that hardly strips it of practical significance.
Nothing could be further from the truth, and one only need
look back to the Detroit riots of 1967 to discern the
reason why. There, the initial conflict was in fact be-
tween "criminals" and the police. But, as matters developed,
great numbers of previously law-abiding citizens were swept
along in a tide of criminal activity which one must assume,
in normal circumstances, would have been completely alien
to them. Certainly, anything that heightens hostility be-
tween citizens and the police, exacerbates already existing
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tensions, or further diminishes public cooperation
with the City's law enforcement activities must be
said to be harmful to the interest and welfare of
the public. In view of the notoriety which the
issue before this panel has gained in the past decade,
and the public attention it has attracted at this
point, it also must be assumed that elimination of
the residency requirement for Detroit police officers
and the subsequent relocation of a significant number
of such officers would have such harmful effects.92
While agreeing that a few officers might experience improved performance with
outside residency, the chairman concluded that on balance
...the interest and welfare of the public in alleviating
racial tension and improving cooperation between citi-
zens and police officers far outweigh the possible per-
sonal benefits which might accrue to some police offi-
cers were they allowed to live outside the City of
Detroit.9 3
In accordance with the Act 312 standards (see p. 58), Platt also con-
sidered comparisons with other city employees (Section 9d) and other relevant
factors (Section 9h). He noted that it was virtually impossible to assess
the situation for employees in Michigan communities similar to Detroit
because there really are none in the state. A list of other large metro-
politan centers in the United States and the status of their residency
or nonresidency provisions had been produced (see p. 62). However, com-
parisons with them were problematic in that there is no evidence that
cities with residency rules have more effective law enforcement than cities
without such rules; nor is there any evidence to the contrary.
Comparisons with other Detroit public employee groups were much more
straightforward since the residency ordinance applies to virtually all city
employees, the only major distinction between police and civil service workers
being in terms of waivers. Platt pointed out that were the residency require-
ment completely eliminated for police, they would be the only city employees
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exempted from the ordinance. In accordance with the Michigan Supreme
Court, there are several reasons why the residency rule is more, not lessf
justifiable for police than for general city employees (see Chapter 2,
pp. 31, 33).95
Platt rejected the union's claim that comparing the contracts negotiated
between the city and the DFFA and the LSA was not appropriate because the
contracts were not the products of meaningful bargaining, The DPOA claimed
the other two public safety unions had achieved economic settlements only
because they abandoned residency when the city adopted a "take it or leave it
attitude." Noting that the DPOA obtained the same economic benefits as
the LSA and DFFA, Platt. commented that to eliminate residency for police would
give them an unfair advantage.
Other factors considered by the chairman included the supply of reasonably
priced housing and the pool of candidates for police jobs. He was convinced
by the city that moderately priced homes were readily available in Detroit
and that there were more than enough qualified candidates for Detroit police
positions. Aware that the department was below authorized strength because of
budgetary restrictions, Platt feared such constraints might become more severe
if the residency requirement were removed.9 7
In the end the chairman rejected the option he had himself raised giving
the police chief power for discretionary waivers. Although his first interest
as an arbitrator was to find an accommodation, by the end of the hearings Platt
was convinced the case required a strict yes or no decision. He claimed he
made this decision partly because the DPOA never expressed much interest in
the discretionary waiver option and partly because city officials persuaded
him that Detroit's economic and racial problems would worsen if the rule
were relaxed,9 8
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Concluding there was "competent, material, and substantial evidence" to
support the city's position, Platt echoed the courts when he said, "this
finding continues a longstanding... policy which bears a reasonable relation-
ship to the valid objects of municipal government... The award and order
specified that the collective bargaining agreement between the city and the
DPOA, retroactive to June 26, 1973 through June 30, 1977 would contain a
residency provision for Detroit police.
In arriving at his conclusions, Platt was heavily persuaded by custom,
legal precedents, the testimony of academics and other experts, and reports
of national commissions. It is interesting to observe that although the
city spent enormous time and money trying to quantify the size and economic
consequences of a police exodus, Platt's judgment on these matters still re-
lied greatly on common sense, logic, and general propositions, Not sur-
prisingly, the arbitration decision upheld existing city policy. More un-
usually, this particular policy, if enforced, holds some potential for




The arbitration decision was a stunning victory for the city and a crush-
ing defeat: for the DPOA. Coleman Young was optimistic that the ruling would
permanently settle the residency issue. He declared, "It's been to court,
it's been to arbitration. and as far as I'm concerned, it's a closed book.1
As far as the union was concerned the last chapter had not yet been written.
Enforcement Loopholes
Administration officials sought immediate removal of the court-ordered
suspension of residency enforcements which had been ihvoked again, this time
in response to the arbitration proceedings. The city intended to force non-
resident officers, estimated to be at least ninety-three, to move to Detroit
or be fired. However, its efforts have been delayed by several developments.
One complication arises from a 1975 circuit court decision which essen-
tially legitimated "dual residency" for police, by effectively upholding the
right of city employees, under certain circumstances, to maintain and live
in Detroit apartments weekdays while their families keep suburban residences.
This was the case involving Lieutenant Eugene Caviston who, in December 1973,
was found guilty of violating the residency ordinance because he lived week-
days in a Detroit apartment while his family lived in Farmington Hills (see
Chapter 2).. Caviston's appeal was delayed for over a year, but in February 1975,
at about the same time the arbitration hearings convened, Wayne County Circuit
Court Judge Blair Moody, Jr. finally overturned the lieutenant's dismissal,
In so doing he commented that the test of a city employee's residence is
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whether sufficient presence can be established at the actual domicile of the
individual, not necessarily that of his family.3 The determination is not pred-
icated upon with whom the officer lives.
In arriving at his decision, Judge Moody addressed the purpose of the
ordinance and the standards of residence. According to his interpretation,
the legislation's objective was to assure an officer's availability for duty
and to provide deterrence off duty.4 The ordinance defines residence as "the
actual domicile of the individual where he normally eats and sleeps and main-
tains his normal personal and household effects."5 Applying this standard to
the Caviston case, Judge Moody declared:
The undisputed facts of [the] record clearly substantiate
the conclusion that Eugene Caviston normally ate and slept
at his Detroit: residence the majority of the time. Moreover,
and of key importance, each week day and night while off duty,
he was always present and available on call at the Detroit
abode 6
The court was particularly impressed by Caviston's off-duty activities.
Since moving back to Detroit in 1972, the officer kept such a vigilant log
of his whereabouts that when, during his previous trial by the residency
unit's trial board, he was accused of not being home early one morning, he
was able to prove that he had been with his landlord making an arrest. Ac-
cording to police and court records, Caviston had not spent one weeknight
since September 1972 at the Farmington Hills home and had visited there only
twice during weekdays. Records also showed that he is a legal Detroit resident
for voting and tax purposes.
Judge Moody cautioned that his decision was based on the unique facts of
Caviston's case. He was careful to point out that the court did not address
the policy question about requiring city residence of police. He claimed that
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whether more or less stringent standards should be adopted is a matter of
legislative concern. In effect, future decisions about the permissibility
of dual residency would be made on a case-specific basis.
Although Moody's decision did not directly affect the arbitration pro-
ceedings, it had far-reaching implications in terms of residency enforcements.
Despite the judge's caution about the narrow applicability of the ruling,
the union was determined to at least try to apply the court's standards and
criteria to the seventy-five pending nonresidency cases. By the end of
February, a second Detroit police officer succeeded in remaining on the force
despite owning a home outside the city where his family lived. Sergeant
Arthur Majeske's case closely paralleled that of Eugene Caviston. In fact,
Majeske was Caviston's landlord. The Majeske decision was the first time a
police department trial board ruled in favor of dual residency. In concluding
that Majeske's Detroit home was the center of his social activities, the board
was strongly influenced by Judge Moody's ruling.
As of fall 1975, the city planned to appeal the dual residency decisions.
Whatever the outcome, the course is bound to be time-consuming, and at a minimum
it will further prolong confusion over enforcement of the residency rule. In
the meantime, additional complications have been raised by the union's decision
to appeal the arbitration ruling in an attempt to stay enforcement until new
contract negotiations open in 1977.
Under Act 312 the conditions for appealing arbitration orders are that;
1. the panel exceeded its authority in its opinion,
2. the opinion is not supported by the evidence, or
2. the opinion was obtained through some fraudulent means such
as bribery or collusion.
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The relative vagueness of these standards would seem to make proof difficult.
Nonetheless, appealing the residency decision was a political necessity for
the DPOA leadership in terms of both reinforcing President Ron Sexton's position
within the rank and file of the union and also strengthening the union's
position relative to the city administration. Although the review proceedings
do not automatically stay the order of an arbitration panel, and the grounds for
the DPOA appeal might be weak; the union hoped the procedure would at least
delay enforcement until the 1977 bargaining.
The DPOA's appeal requested that the arbitration award be reversed or,
alternatively, set aside and another Act 312 proceeding ordered. It based
its argument on the following charges:
A. The Opinion and Award is null because the panel was not
established, did not function and did not decide the matter
in accordance with the requirements of due process of law.
B. The Opinion and Award is not the result or product of deter-
minations or written findings of fact by a majority of the
Arbitration Panel.
C. The Opinion and Award is based in part on material which
was not introduced into evidence as part of the official
record. [The DPOA charged that in his opinion Harry Platt
cited a quote from Attorney George Edwards to the city's
representative, Allan Davis, about the city's objections
to the union's offer that nonresident officers would pay
the 2 percent resident income tax. According to the union,
this discussion never became part of the official record.]
D. The Opinion and Award is not supported by competent material
and substantial evidence on the whole record. 0
Sexton claimed the evidence did not prove that the public interest is served
by requiring police residency. Furthermore, he maintained the ruling failed
to address the constitutionality question. Although the union's appeal was
filed in late September 1975, action on the matter was delayed indefinitely,
partially as a result of problems in getting the arbitration record certified1 2
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(allegedly because of confusion over the return of some original exhibits
necessary to complete the official record).
Even were the union's appeal activated, Harry Platt was confident about
having followed the Act 312 standards so closely that his opinion could not
be overturned. Indeed, his reputation supported his contention. Of the more
than 4,000 cases he has decided, he has been appealed only a handful of times
and has never been reversed. The veteran arbitrator commented:
My own feeling is that unless circumstances change --
and I can't conceive of them changing that much -- this
[ruling] pretty well decides the issue on the merits.1 3
Platt's comment, however, overlooked the potential problems with enforcement arising
from the "dual residency" rulings and from the fact that the residency issue
can be raised again during the 1977 negotiations. The union's manipulation of
these loopholes has the potential for indefinitely blocking the ordinance's strict
14
application.1 4
Institutional Decision Making and Collective Bargaining
Although the DPOA lost on the direct issue of eliminating residency re-
quirements, its success in obstructing enforcement of Detroit's policy is an
important influence in itself. Significantly, though, the source of this power
was really grounded in the institutional decision-making channels. By working
through legal and collective bargaining procedures the union succeeded in pro-
longing its struggle against a city law. The development of the case was in
large measure a product of some of the idiosyncracies of these processes.
Perhaps one of the most obvious characteristics illustrated by the study
is the litigous nature of American decision making. The courts provided the
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initial forum through which the DPOA sought to attack the residency ordinance.
Even after the constitutionality issue was resolved, the courts continued to
play a key role through judicial review of administrative labor proceedings.
In this way the legal system plays an important role both in shaping the
collective bargaining system and in influencing public policy. In light of
the overriding importance of the judiciary, the significance of legal counsel
as a union resource becomes apparent.
Because the residency question was originally raised as a condition of
work in police labor negotiations, the bargaining system offered the union
an alternative means through which to challenge the rule. The bargaining
issues raised by the Detroit residency case were typical of the kinds of
problems which have plagued the developing field of public sector labor re-
lations. One of the first problems to emerge was confusion between the legis-
lative and executive branches over bargaining authority: while the executive
branch generally has overall responsibility for the bureaucracy, the legislature
appropriates money and generally approves the financial terms of contracts.
A result of this fragmentation of municipal decision-making powers is the
multilateral nature of public sector bargaining, one of its distinguishing
features.16
By way of example, the original residency negotiations in 1967-68 involved
the city labor relations director, the police commissioner, the mayor, the
Common Council, and the DPOA. While the mayor, the Labor Relations Bureau
the union came to one agreement, the Common Council made a separate decision
and passed the residency ordinance without any discussion with the union. Based
on the particular facts of the case at this time, both MERC and the courts ruled
that the Common Council had the authority to enact the ordinance. In this
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particular instance confusion over responsibility for bargaining and the mul-
tiplicity of negotiators worked against the union. Nonetheless, in other in-
stances, this feature offers the unions potential for manipulating multiple
access points to work to their advantage.
A second major labor relations issue raised by the case concerned the
scope of bargaining in the public sector. This topic has generated considerable
public debate. In the private sector the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
specifies that "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" are
the only subjects on which management must negotiate. In the public sector,
however, the scope is less clear; and on the ground that issues previously re-
garded as policy matters directly affect working conditions, unions have been
demanding a voice in their settlement. Public employers claim responsibility
to retain sole authority over public policy decisions and therefore argue the
scope should be limited. Other critics have objected that an enlarged scope,
combined with weak or inept management, could create contractual constraints on
public managers, which would bind future generations of policy makers. A more
political argument would place limits on subjects to be decided through bargain-
ing because that process affects parties excluded from the decision making.
Proponents of this line of reasoning claim the general problem is exacerbated by
the strike threat which gives public employees enormous political influence over
18
matters of general community concern.
In Michigan the scope of bargainable issues under PERA is identical to
those specified in the NLRA. In the public sector, though, the definition of
"terms and conditions of employment" is often problematic. As the residency
case demonstrated, it is frequently difficult to distinguish among working
conditions, public policy issues, and constitutional prerogatives of legislative
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and executive authority. Public employers in Michigan can bargain only with
respect to those powers vested in them by the legislature. Thus, there are
subjects bargainable in the private sector not subject to negotiation in
the public sector. Conversely, there are issues such as city residency
requirements which are specific to the.public sector and therefore without
private sector precedent. The definition of bargainable subjects in the public
sector has been proceeding on a case-by-case basis through administrative and
court interpretations. The way this determination was made relative to resi-
dency requirements in Detroit offered a revealing example of how the judicial
and administrative systems overlap and sometimes work at cross purposes.
As described by University of Michigan Law Professor Harry T. Edwards,
a "tug-of-war" developed between the Michigan courts and MERC over whether
municipal residency requirements passed pursuant to the state's Home Rule
Cities Act can be excluded from the scope of bargaining.2 0 The city first
agreed that residency is a condition of work therefore negotiable. It later
reversed its position and insisted the rules are not bargainable because they
come within the managerial prerogatives of local governments under "Home Rule."
In March 1971 MERC held that residency requirements are a mandatory bargaining
subject regardless of the state Home Rule statute. At about the same time
the Michigan Supreme Court, seemingly without considering the effect of its
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decision on collective bargaining, upheld the constitutionality of Detroit's resi-
dency ordinance and ruled that its enactment was a legitimate exercise of
municipal authority.
The Michigan Court of Appeals then had to decide the effect of these
decisions on the scope of bargaining, One year later the appellate court re-
versed MERC, holding that residency requirements were no longer mandatorily
negotiable. It was not until February 1974 that the Michigan Supreme Court
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finally affirmed MERC's ruling. The court stated definitively that residency is
a mandatory bargaining subject, and bargaining cannot be avoided through the
enactment of a valid city ordinance.
This decision was pivotal for several reasons. It was believed to be the
first time a state supreme court ruled on the bargainability of residency re-
quirements, and, as such, it had potential national significance, Union
challenges to residency requirements on constitutionality grounds have lost
consistently in the courts. Now, at least in Michigan, the bargainability
decision offered the unions a new opportunity to challenge the rules. If a
residency policy for city employees was likely, at least the bargaining system
would give the unions a chance to negotiate over the terms of the policy.
The ruling revitalized the DPOA's struggle be enabling it to raise
the residency issue during the 1974 negotiations. Moreover, the decision
makes it possible for the residency topic to be kept a "live" issue, perhaps
indefinitely, since either side can raise the matter in-future negotiations.
In addition, by expanding the scope of bargaining, the decision increased the
union's potential influence over managerial decision making and the allocation
of public resources. Ultimately, then, the general absence of guidelines in
the relatively new public sector bargaining process (especially pertaining to
the scope of bargaining) worked to the DPOA's advantage in this particular in-
stance.
Interestingly, the nature of the legal and administrative challenges caused
the parties to focus on procedural matters as an important means to promote
their interests. The DPOA wanted to define residency requirements as a nego-
tiable item so it could use the collective bargaining process as another channel
through which to exert pressure. The city's denial that residency was a condition
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of work, especially after its original admission to the contrary, was clearly
an attempt to limit the union's bargaining influence, The final decision had
nothing to do with the merit of residency requirements but rather with inter-
pretations about bargaining rules and procedures. Nonetheless, as this case
vividly illustrated, such procedural decisions have far-reaching policy con-
sequences.
Combined with the bargainability decision, changes in statutory provisions
for public safety impasse procedures opened an entirely new chapter in the
munion's struggle. In 1.969 Michigan passed a Police and Firefighters Arbitration
Act (PFFA) which requires the parties to negotiate beyond impasse and thus
forecloses unilateral action to the employer. The notion of a duty to
bargain beyond impasse in the public sector has developed largely in response
to the strike proscription. The assumption is that restrictions on public
sector strikes, which are imposed because of the perceived essentiality of
certain public services, deny government employees a powerful economic weapon
available to private employees. As compensation, compulsory arbitration (also
known as interest or binding arbitration) is increasingly being relied upon as
one of the best alternatives for promoting both union and public interests.
However, with increased use, arbitration is also beginning to reveal some of
its limitations.
Theoretically, arbitrators are expert "neutral" parties expected to act
on behalf of the public's interest. In reality, as the residency case showed,
their decisions rarely are neutral but rather more often are political in
nature, having far-reaching consequences in terms of the distribution of public
resources. Thus, a major criticism of arbitration is that it delegates such
extensive authority to a single individual, unaccountable to either the public
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or elected officials, (While collective bargaining represents a partial dele-
gation of government power, arbitration represents a more nearly complete
delegation. 2 3 )
Harry Platt's arbitration award went against the union and presumably
in favor of the majority of Detroit citizens. (He reasoned that the possible
individual benefits to DPOA members of reduced stress which might result from
suburban residency did not outweigh the perceived benefits to the public of
requiring municipal police residency,) In general, however, given the problems
associated with collective bargaining and compulsory arbitration, there are
no guarantees that these processes will always promote the public interest.
Difficulties arise not only from limitations inherent in the processes, but
from problems in defining the "public interest." Identification of the public
good is often complicated by conflicts among the goals and interests of the
various groups affected by public sector labor relations. As the residency
case showed, the most pervasive conflicts sometimes arise not between labor
and management but between the unions and the "public." (For instance, the
original salary increases demanded by the DPOA would have contributed greatly
to the need for layoffs and reduced city services.)
In addition to political questions raised by bargaining and impasse pro-
cedures, another major issue concerns the qualifications and ability of an
individual arbitrator to make decisions with broad public policy consequences.
At present arbitration work in the public sector is often dominated by lawyers.
However, arising from frustrated contract negotiations, compulsory arbitration
raises many economic as well as legal questions. Because arbitration decisions
can produce systemic impacts which affect inputs (e.g. taxes) and outputs
(e.g. services) of government, an arbitrator must take into account the interplay
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of several factors including labor costs, government revenues and expenditures,
taxes, employment levels, work rules, and productivity. This situation has
caused Columbia University Business School Professor Raymond Horton to pose
the following questions:
Do lawyers, or for that matter nonlawyers primarily experienced
as labor relations practitioners, possess the training and
understanding required to render sound decisions in interest
arbitration? Do those skills that promote success in non-
compulsory, frequently mediative labor relations functions also
promote success in fulfilling the quite different and far more
important decision-making responsibilities involved in interest
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arbitration?
In Michigan, arbitrators, whatever their training, are allowed considerable
discretion in making their decisions since the statutory guidelines for ar-
riving at arbitration awards are quite broad. In a study of the impact of
legislated criteria on arbitrations, Michael J. Klapper argued that in Michigan
the guidelines "offered little to the process which experienced arbitrators
could not have already brought with them." Thus, although Harry Platt, a
veteran arbitrator, was extremely careful to follow the Act 312 standards,
it is not clear that he proceeded any differently with guidelines than he
would have without them, nor is it certain that his final decision would have
been any different. Perhaps, as suggested by Klapper, the chief utility of
statutory guidelines is as justification for awards in the event of appeals.
The assumption is that arbitration decisions cannot be overturned as easily
if the courts are forced to use legislated criteria to determine whether an
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award has exceeded an arbitrator's authority. As mentioned before, Platt
was so confident about having followed the Act 312 standards that he doubted
his decision could be overturned.
While one of the general purposes of arbitration is to encourage nego-
tiation, it-is interesting that in the residency case the city won its desired
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outcome by refusing to bargain. This result is even more striking given
Michigan's history of arbitration awards which are generally favorable to the
unions. Coleman Young's determination to gamble on maintaining a strict residency
position may have partially reflected his personal familiarity with labor nego-
tiations and his political astuteness in correctly reading the time and circum-
stances surrounding the residency dispute. Unlike the issues in many past ar-
bitrations, the residency controversy directly challenged a longstanding city
policy, and arbitrators are often reluctant to change the status quo by taking
anything away. In Harry Platt's case this general tendency was reinforced by
his legal background and sensitivity to judicial precedents. In addition,
everyone including Platt was fully aware of the political importance of the
residency policy to Detroit's first black mayor.
Although allegedly the "end" of the bargaining process, arbitration ob-
viously has not stopped action on the Detroit residency matter. Last recourse,
again, is an appeal to the courts. The seeming lack of finality in this par-
ticular case results in part from the alternative interactions of the legal and
administrative systems and the ongoing process of negotiations. And not only
is the entire decision-making process time consuming, it is costly as well.
The system clearly afforded the union numerous opportunities for exercising
influence, but to take advantage of these options required considerable re-
sources. At the same time, the city was forced to spend thousands of dollars
of taxpayers' money for defenses. In addition to the enormous costs of
lawyers and legal proceedings, in Michigan the two parties and the state divide
the costs of arbitration and the panel chairman.2 7
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Police Residency Requirements: Policy Impacts
Given the tremendous social and economic costs born by the public in the
police residency dispute, the next logical question is what impact the requirement
makes on the lives of Detroit citizens. Does the rule actually promote the
"public interest" and if so, how? Is residency a good policy for improving
the quality of police services, recruiting more blacks in the police depart-
ment, or improving the city's financial situation?
One of the most persistent policy concerns associated with police resi-
dency is its impact on law enforcement and the delivery of police services.
Residency requirements are related to personnel recruitment, and, in a "street-
level bureaucracy" such as the police department where face-to-face contact
and discretion are important, who gets hired to deliver services is especially
significant. As mentioned repeatedly throughout this study, the conventional
wisdom holds that residency requirements will facilitate minority recruitment
and hiring. In this respect another important policy-related impact of resi-
dency is on the distribution of jobs. In a very broad sense, if the conventional
wisdom is true, residency requirements could help to redistribute wealth and
power from the white to the black community.
However, the evidence that a residency policy is effective in increasing
the number of black police officers is far from convincing. There is no con-
sistent proof that cities with residency rules necessarily have higher percen-
tages of black officers than cities without such rules. Data for 1965 con-
cerning the percentages of nonwhite officers in police departments throughout
the nation showed that Buffalo, a city with a strict residency rule, only had
3-percent nonwhites; 18 percent of its total population was nonwhite. As of
1965 when Detroit's internal department rule was in effect, the police force
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was only about 5-percent nonwhite, but blacks constituted 39 percent of the
total city population. The forces of Newark. and Atlanta each were 10-percent
nonwhite even though Newark' had a residency rule and Atlanta did not (40 per-
cent of Newark's and 38 percent of Atlanta's citizens were minorities), Wash-
ington, D.C. was among the cities with the highest percentage of black police
(21 percent of its force), and yet it did not have a strict residency require-
ment. Instead, it had a modified rule which required residence within a twenty-
five-mile radius of the Capitol building,. The city also had a heavily black
population, 63 percent.2 9
Establishing a direct causal relationship between residency requirements
and the percentage of blacks on a police force is virtually impossible. Several
other factors must be taken into account"including the percentage of nonwhites
in the general city population and regional differences. Furthermore, residency
rules are only one of many entry-level standards and conditions of work. Such
rules can potentially work to the advantage of blacks, but there are still
numerous other institutional barriers (e.g, educational requirements and written
and oral tests) which mediate against minority hiring, In addition current
budgetary restrictions and affirmative action programs further complicate the
30
impact of a residency policy on black recruitment. Although residency re-
quirements alone are not sufficient to ensure minority hiring, in combination
with other factors they can perhaps help to change the distribution of city jobs.
Not only is it difficult to discern the impact of a residency policy on
personnel recruitment and hiring, but it is perhaps even harder to determine
the impact of recruitment on law enforcement and the delivery of police ser-
vices, On the'night of July 29, 1975 Detroit experienced a civil disturbance
which erupted from the shooting of a black youth by a white bar owner. The
incident had the potential for a full-scale racial outbreak such as the 1967
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Detroit riot. After two tense nights of modified police mobilizations, violence
was ended. Some observers at least partially attributed the outcome to the
increased number of blacks on the force (approximately 17 percent of Detroit's
officers were minorities at this time ) and to improved police-community re-
lations. However, it is impossible to do more than speculate about the in-
dependent contribution made by black officers toward the resolution of the
incident. Other factors must also be taken into account in explaining the
outcome: Mayor Young made personal appearances at the scene of the distur-
bance, which was located in a neighborhood where he had spent time growing
up. In addition, bitter memories of the disastrous results of the 1967 dis-
turbances may have tempered the reactions of both blacks and whites. 3 3
Despite the logical appeal of the arguments to many Detroit residents
and public officials, it is also hard to determine without conclusive docu-
mentation if police residency improves law enforcement as a result of officers'
commitment to the community, increased accountability and honesty, twenty-four-
hour duty, and availability for emergencies. However, even if these assertions
were true, many of the potential impacts would seemingly be undermined by the
fact that police are not required to live in the same precincts where they work.
Consequently, most officers do not reside in high-crime neighborhoods where
their presence presumably would be the most beneficial.
In the final analysis, proving anything empirically about the relationship
among residency requirements, black recruitment, and the quality of police services
is extremely difficult. Significantly though, at least part of the impact of
a residency policy in Detroit may result from the black community's perception
of the DPOA's struggle as an expression of hostility and an effort to exclude
minorities from the police department.
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Given the strengths and weaknesses of residency as a policy to help im-
prove law enforcement and to facilitate black recruitment, its effectiveness
in helping to alleviate Detroit's financial troubles must also be weighed.
Despite the city's extensive and expensive efforts, it is impossible to quantify
the exact economic consequences of allowing nonresidency of city employees.
On the whole the city's financial arguments were probably somewhat overstated,
based on upper estimates of employee departure figures and questionable assump-
tions about the amount of resident income spent in Detroit. Nonetheless, fi-
nancial factors are of immediate universal concern, especially during times of
a depressed economy. Thus, the exact magnitude of the financial consequences
of nonresidency were not nearly as important to the outcome of the case as
was the general intuitive appeal of the economic arguments to Platt and city
residents. While it was not certain that a residency policy would improve
Detroit's financial situation, many citizens and elected officials perceived
that allowing nonresidency could worsen already bad conditions.
Another economic issue, the "public coffer" notion that resources of the city
belong to city residents, was also expressed in the Detroit case. This concern be-
comes increasingly popular during a fiscal crisis. City dwellers resent the idea
of "helping to support" the suburbs. They expect that, by paying salaries to resi-
dent employees, the city will help reduce urban unemployment and will benefit through
taxes and general expenditures in the local economy. Such economic considerations
are among the most popular public rationales for residency rules today and have
contributed to the recent movement in several cities (e.g. New York, Trenton, Boston,
Washington, D.C.) to reimpose or institute the requirements. (This current trend re-
ceived added impetus with a March 1976 United States Supreme Court ruling which up-
34held the power of municipalities to impose residency regulations. ) Thus, many
present controversies over residency policies are closely tied to deep-rooted city-
suburban antagonisms.
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Police Residency Requirements: A Symbolic Political Issue
The questionable validity of many of the arguments both for and against
the residency policy made the topic extremely controversial. But this still
does not fully explain why so much time, money, and energy have been spent
on residency challenges in Detroit. In large measure, the publicity resulting
from the protracted legal and administrative challenges and the accompanying
rhetoric were critical determinants of the issue's salience over an eight-
year period. Tracing the evolution of the dispute strongly suggests its
symbolic political importance.
Mayor Cavanagh was willing to liberalize and formalize the police resi-
dency rule partially in response to the 1967 fact-finding panel recommendations
and partially as a "sweetener" for inducing the DPOA to agree to delay im-
plementation of its newly won wage increases. In addition, Cavanagh believed
the matter was administrative. The Common Council disagreed with the mayor
and went on to pass the residency ordinance, allegedly for financial and racial
reasons. Among other things, this incident illustrated how the structure of
government and confusion about authority for bargaining contributed to the
development of a city's residency policy. Detroit has a strong mayor-council
form of government. The residency ordinance resulted at least in part from
a power struggle between a liberal mayor and a conservative council, who differed
in their views about police residency.
During the Gribbs administration the focus of the controversy shifted from
the legislative and executive branches to the courts. Upholding the constitu-
tionality of the residency ordinance, one of the Michigan Supreme Court justices
addressed the need for black recruitment and improved police-community relations.
Following this decision, the topic of police residency enforcements became one
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of the most hotly-debated issues in Detroit government. As the dispute be-
tween the DPOA and the city persisted and as Detroit became more black and
more polarized, the residency issue became even more racial and more political.
By 1973 the topic of law enforcement and police residency became a major
mayoral campaign issue. Coleman Young, an attractive black candidate, and
John Nichols, a popular police candidate, both capitalized on the political
saliency of crime and law and order issues. Public fear of crime, a major
concern nationally, was especially acute in Detroit which had been dubbed
"kill city."
Once Young was elected, the residency dispute became symbolic of the
struggle for control of the police department between Detroit's first black
mayor and the predominantly white police union. As far as Young was concerned
the controversy also raised the more general question of whether, as blacks
begin to run the cities, they will allow whites to change the rules to their
favor. Young openly identified tne residency conflict as primarily racial.
He publicly emphasized the relationship between the residency requirement and
black recruitment and also addressed the connection between the rule and de
facto residential segregation. (It is interesting to consider what might
happen when more blacks secure city jobs and become middle-class. Very
likely, they also will want to move to the suburbs. Accordingly, they may
change their position and argue that the residency rule promotes reverse seg-
regation, a likelihood that underscores the racial and political nature of
the issue.) Nonetheless, in 1975 the controversy involved major questions of com-
munity control and job access and symbolized to blacks broad issues concerning the
redistribution of wealth, power, and prestige in Detroit. For whites fearful
of crime the issue was one of obtaining maximum security from a resident police
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force available for twenty-four-hour duty.
The residency topic became an emotional rallying point for DPOA members
and, consequently, became critically important to the union leadership in
terms of both internal DPOA and also city politics. By the time the residency
ordinance was enacted, the DPOA had established itself as a viable political
force. Its challenge to the city legislation became a test of the union's in-
fluence and an opportunity to expand its power. If the DPOA succeeded in
blocking the mayor on the residency issue, it would be a tremendous political
victory for the union. For these reasons, pressure was on the union leader-
ship to exploit all possible means for prolonging the struggle.
Union Influence
The extended residency dispute aptly demonstrated the importance of poli-
tical, economic, and statutory factors in determining the relative power of
the union at a single point in time. The DPOA's failure to change the resi-
dency policy was largely a result of economic, social, and administrative
concerns which led to political alliances strong enough to successfully oppose
it. Although the mayor, the Common Council, the police chief, blacks, and
whites fearful of crime all differed in their motivations, they all supported
continuation of the residency rule. The DPOA and other public employee unions
were the only major groups with a vested interest in modifying the residency
rules. In the end, the DPOA lost the support of even the other public safety
unions.
Despite its defeat on the residency rule elimination, the union did achieve
other goals in the course of its struggle, In addition to its previously
mentioned success in blocking enforcement of the ordinance, one of the DPOA's
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major accomplishments was expanding its potential influence over city policy
making and public resource allocation, which resulted from the determination
that residency rules are bargainable. As a general observation about public
employee organizations, Hervey Juris and Peter Feuille argue that "the real
impact of the union has been to force shared decision-mraking in the allocation
,,35
of resources," both monetary and nonmonetary. The possible consequences of
this development in the residency dispute are important to consider.
The Detroit case suggests the DPOA's interest in influencing the residency
policy as a means to control who gets police jobs, probably at the expense of
36
minorities. In addition, if the previously discussed economic arguments hold
(see p. 106 above and Chapter 4), allowing nonresidency would contribute to weight-
ing the distribution of public resources in favor of the suburbs at the city's
expense. Although the union was defeated on the particular policy matter of
residency rules, the decision-making process was time consuming and costly for
both the DPOA and the city. Enormous sums of public money were spent on legal
and administrative proceedings. And the struggle is not yet over. If and how
Detroit's residency policy is enforced still remains to be determined.
In light of these considerations, the strong opposition to the DPOA is
not surprising. ignificantly, the outcome of the case as it stands illustrates
some of the specific limitations to the DPOA's power as well as suggests a few
of the more general current constraints on most public employee unions.
The situation as expressed by this study has changed dramatically
since the heyday of the sixties when the newly-organized city workers
were granted union prerequisites. They were extraordinarily successful
in achieving substantial economic gains as well as some influence over
personnel matters and policy formulation. Although the exact reasons for these
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extensive concessions by public officials are not entirely clear, several political
analysts have suggested that one major factor was the desire of moderate-to-liberal
mayors to gain electoral strength.3 7 Theodore Lowi argues that with the erosion of the
traditional party machinery elected officials turned to public employees as
a major source of support. The political wisdom was that the large numbers
of city workers and their relatives constituted a sizeable voting bloc which,
though not necessarily homogeneous, was nonetheless extremely influential.
An additional reason for wooing municipal employees was to avoid service dis-
ruptions that could cause politicians a loss of electoral support. These
political considerations contributed greatly to the granting of bargaining
rights to public employees, a development which has altered the distribution
of power in the cities.
Over the last few years, however, changing conditions, particularly
economic, have led to some changing attitudes toward unions on the part of both
city leaders and the general public. Previous assumptions about how essen-
tial public services are and how much public demand there is for them, regard-
less of price, are currently being challenged. Suffering from the effects of
inflation and recession, taxpayers are increasingly reluctant to pay the demands
of city employees. They have become somewhat mcre tolerant of service dis-
ruptions in an effort to support officials in hard bargaining.
Frightened by the specter of New York's fiscal crisis, growing numbers
of city leaders are adopting the view that standing up to the unions can be
beneficial both economically and politically. The new perception is that in some
cases more can be gained at the polls from irate taxpayers than would be lost to the
unions by taking a hard line in bargaining. Coleman Young had no fear of losing
political support by opposing the DPOA on the residency issue and, in fact,
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perceived an overall gain in strength by taking this position.
Several other recent examples illustrate the trend toward stiffening
resistance to union demands. During July 1975 Albuquerque, New Mexico sat
out a ten-day police strike after public officials refused to grant the union's
wage demand. When the city threatened to accept the resignations of more than
300 officers, the frightened police returned to work accepting the same pay raise
they had previously rejected. After an initial rejection, Berkeley police also
agreed to accept the City Council's original pay offer when the city withstood
a twenty-five-day strike in September 1975.
In San Francisco Mayor Joseph Alioto, forbidden by law to seek a third
term in 1975, used his emergency powers to grant striking policemen and fire-
men most of the pay increases they sought although the Board of Supervisors,
whose members were seeking reelection, strenuously objected. Alioto conceded
the political widsom of their stand by suggesting that labor-oriented can-
didates did not stand a chance to win in the city that year. The public re-
sponded to Alioto's action by passing a proposition limiting the mayor's
emergency powers in similar future situations.
Whether economic and political factors 'continue to encourage this trend
is yet to be determined. Nonetheless, despite current constraints on their
influence, municipal employee unions have already become an institutionalized
force in city politics, as evidenced by the numerous examples of their power.
On the one hand, they have helped win significant gains for public employees in-
cluding wage increases and fringe benefits, improved working conditions, and grievance
procedures to protect workers from inconsistent treatment. On the other hand,
they have contributed to obstructing the redistribution of services, restricting
minority hiring, and creating public inconvenience through employee slowdowns
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and work stoppages. Public employee organizations have been one major factor
in limiting mayoral control over the distribution of increasingly scarce pub-
lic resources. As the Detroit residency case illustrated, they can have an
important impact on public policy. Exactly how these unions and collective
bargaining shape the future of our cities remains to be seen, but the fact of
their influence is clearly established; its ultimate desirability is an open
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AN ORDINANCE to amend Chapter 2,
Article of the Code of the City of
Detroit by adding new sections to
be known as sections 2-1-1.2 and 2-
1-1.3. to provide for residency
requirements for city employees.
IT IS HEREBY ORDAINED BY THE
PEOPLE OF THE CITY OF DETROIT:
Section 1. That Chapter 2, Article 1
of the Code of the City of Detroit be
amended by adding new sections
thereto to be known as sections 2-1-
1.2, and 21-1.3, to read as follows:
Section 2-1-1.2. Residence shall be
construed to be the actual domicile
of the Individual where he normally
eats and sleeps and maintains his
normal personal and household cf-
fccts..
Section 2-1-1.3. All pollce officers,
, appointees In the unclasslicd service.
except the director of the zoo and
superintendent of the ouse of Cor-
rection, and all persons working in
any branch of the classifled service of
Detroit
Residency
the city shall reside in the City of.
Detroit. The Civil Service Commission
may waive the residency requirement
for employment in the classified serv-
ice upon a finding that such waiver
would serve the best interest of the
city. When waiving the residency re-
quirement, the Civil Service Commis-
sion shall base their determination
upon:
(1) The nature of the work.(2) The location of the work. and(3) All other pertinent facts con-
cerning employment.
The commission shall promptly re-
port any waiver of residency require-
ment to the Mayor and the Common
Council.
Section 2. This ordinance Is de-
clared necessary for the preservation
of the peace, health. safety and
welfare of the people of the City of
Detroit, and is hereby given imme-
diate effect.
(JCC p. 850, April 30. 1968).
P.ssed May 28, 1968.
Approved June 4, 1968.
Published June 5, . .19G8.
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the commissioner enumerated under section 5, all of which
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must be "exercised and performed as herein provided and
in accordance with the laws of the state and ordinances
of the city," ... (DPOA, [supra n. 5 at 532 in n. 26.)
41. Idem at 522. The equal protection test was summarized by the
Michigan Supreme Court in Tracer v Bushre, 381 Mich 282 (1968),
at 286, 287 which quoted Cook Coffee v. Village of Flushing, 267
Mich 131 (1934) at 134. See also Chapter 4, n. 6.
42. Idem at 522, 523.
43. Idlem at 533, 534.
44. Idem at 534, 535.
45. Idem at 535.
46. Idem at 524.
47. Detroit Free Press, 16 September 1971.
A48. "Jurisdictional Statement"at 8. Supreme Court of the United States,
October Term, 1971. DPOA v. City of Detroit, (supra, n. 5).
49. "Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief"
(3 April 1969), pp. 1-2. DPOA v. City of Detroit (supra, n. 1).
50. "Answer to Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive
Relief and Motion to Dismiss" (24 April 1969), p. 2, in DPOA v.
City of Detroit (supra, n. 1).
51. Detroit News, 24 July 1969.
52. John F. Nichols, Police Commissioner, "Letter to Councilman Carl
Levin" (28 August 1972); Detroit News, 19 July 1972.
53. Detroit Free Press, 20 February 1973.
54. Nichols, "Letter to the Common Council" (22 December 1972).
55. Ibid.
56. Charles A. Meyer, Secretary and Chief Examiner, Civil Service Com-
mission, "Letter to the Common Council" (2 January 1973).
57. Dr. Mel Ravitz, former Common 'Council member, Interview,
18 August 1975.
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58. Detroit News, 1 December 1973.
59. Detroit Free Press, 1 December 1973.
60. Detroit Free Press, 28 November 1974.
Chapter 3
1. City of Detroit, 1971 MERC Lab. Op. 237 at 239.
2. Public Employment Relations Act (PERA), Act 379, PA 1965 as amended;
MCLA 423.215, MSA 17.455 (15).
3. City of Detroit, (supra, n. 1), at 253.
4. Idem at 254.
5. Idem.
6. "Memorandum of Agreement Between the City of Detroit and the DPOA"
(March 1968).
7. City of Detroit, (supra, n. 1), at 255.
8. Idem.
9. Detroit Police Officers Association (DPOA) v. City of Detroit,
391 Mich 44 (1974) at 56; Harry T. Edwards, "The Emerging Duty to
Bargain in the Public Sector," Michigan Law Review 885 (1973):
923-924. This conceDt comes from the private sector where, under
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), when good faith bargain-
ing has reached an impasse, the employer may take unilateral action
if it is consistent with the terms of its final offer to the union
(NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 [1962]). However, more recently, the
public sector has begun to institute procedures such as fact find-
ing and arbitration to require parties to negotiate beyond impasse.
10. City of Detroit, 1971 MERC Lab. Op. 237 at 240.
11. Decided in Detroit Fire Commissioners, 1970 MERC Lab. Op. 953.
12 City of Detroit, (supra, n. 1), at 240, in n. 1 of the decision.
13. Idem at 241.
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14. "Brief of City of Detroit, Appellee," p. 7, in DPOA v. City of
Detroit, (supra, n. 9), no. 54411.
15. City of Detroit, (supra, n. 1), at 249, 250.
16. DPOA v. City of Detroit, 41 Mich App 723 (1972).
17. Idem at 728.
18. "Brief of Detroit Police Officers Association, Plaintiff-Appel-
lant," pp. 10-11 in DPOA v. City of Detroit, (supra, n. 9),
no. 54411.
19. Idem at 11-13. PERA is unlike the law in some states where conditions
of employment controlled by a valid ordinance are exempted from the
scope of bargaining: DPOA v. City of Detroit, (supra, n. 9), at
58-59 in n. 8.
20. Public Employment Relations Act as amended, (supra, n. 2); "Brief of
Detroit Police Officers Association, Plaintiff-Appellant," p. 14.
21. "Brief of City of Detroit, Appellee," p. 18, in DPOA v. City of
Detroit, (supra, n. 9).
22. "Brief of Michigan Employment Relations Commission, Appellee and Cross-
Appellant," pp. !5-6 in DPOA v. City of Detroit, (supra, n. 9). no. 54411.
23. Idem at 7.
24. DPOA v. City of Detroit, (supra, n. 9), at 57.
25. Idem at 61.
26. Idem at 63.
27. Detroit Free Press, 16 February 1974.
28. "Brief on Behalf of Detroit Police Officers Association," for "Police
Residency: Compulsory Arbitration" (August 1975), p. 2.
29. Transcripts of testimony for "Police Residency: Compulsory Arbitration,"
vol. XII, p. 36.
30. Detroit News, 18 March 1974.
31. Ibid.
32. Transcripts of testimony, vol IV, p. 119.
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33. Detroit Free Press, 16 February 1974.
34. Detroit News, 28 February 1974.
35. Police and Firefighters Arbitration Act (PFFA), Act 312 of Public
Acts Qf 1969. The Act provides that once an impasse has been
reached, either the employees or the employer may request compul-
sory arbitration, thus foreclosing unilateral action by the public
employer (as happened in the Common Council's passage of the 1968
residency ordinance). The issues are heard by a panel consisting of
three members, one each chosen by the two disputants and a third
mutually agreeable party who is chairman. For a very useful dis-
cussion about the legislative history, provisions, and adminis-
tration of PFFA see pp. 37-75 in James L. Stern; Charles M. Rhemus;
J. Joseph Loewenberg; Hirschel Kasper; Barbara D. Dennis; Final
Offer Arbitration (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath
and Company, 1975). See also Hyman Parker, Michigan Public Employ-
ment Relations Act and Procedures, The Employment Relations Study
Series, no. 1 (1975, third ed. East Lansing: The School of Labor
and Industrial Relations, Michigan State University), pp. 22-25.
36. Detroit News, 25 July 1974.
37. Detroit News, 21 August 1974.
38. Detroit Free Press, 22 August 1974.
39. The intent of the "last best offer" provision is to force each
party to be as realistic as possible in its final economic offers,
theoretically bringing the sides closer together than in past bar-
gaining positions. See Parker, Michigan Public Employment Relations
Acts and Procedures, pp. 24-25; see also Stern et al., Final Offer
Arbitration, pp. 46-49.
40. Detroit News, 31 October 1974. Ron Sexton had campaigned for a hard




43. Detroit News, 30 October 1974. Before the new agreement first-year
sergeants had been paid $18,300 a year with lieutenants receiving
$20,500.
44. Detroit Free Press, 9 January 1975. The new agreement boosted the
annual pay for experienced firemen from $15,000 to approximately
$17,300 beginning July 1, 1975.
45. Ibid.
46. Detroit News, 7 September 1975.
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Chapter 4
1. Harry Platt, "Opinion and Award" (September 5, 1975) for "Police Resi-
dency: Compulsory Arbitration," p. 5.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 31
4. Ibid., p. 38.
5. For a summary of this test and its application to police residency cases,
see Michael F. Barnes, "Municipal Police Residency Restriction: Remnant
of Feudalism or Sound Public Policy?" Public Safety Labor Reporter
(June 1974), pp. 3-32 - 3-35.
For a discussion of suspect clafficiation and fundamental interest
see "Developments - Equal Protection," Harvard Law Review 82 (1969):
1087-1131.
Shapiro v. Thompson, 395 U.S. 618 (1969) was the first case to apply
the "compelling state interest" test to a residency statute. The plain-
tiffs attacked durational residency statues which denied welfare assistance
to state residents who had not lived within state boundaries for at least
one full year immediately preceding their applications for aid. The court
invalidated the statutes on the ground that they restricted interstate
travel (which the court held is a fundamental right and can only be cur-
tailed for a "compelling state interest") by effectively cutting individuals
off from any public benefits given on the basis of residency.
6. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911) stated the full
reasonableness test. A discussion of the "compelling state interest" and
rational basis standards is presented by Philip P. Houle in "Compelling
State Interest vs. Mere Rational Classification: The Practitioner's Equal
Protection Dilemma," The Urban Lawyer 3 (1971): 375-427. Barnes (supra, n. 5),
pp. 3-30 - 3-32, discusses police residency cases which applied the equal
protection rational basis standard to test the validity of various resi-
dency rules.
7. DPOA v. City of Detroit, 385 Mich 519 (1971) at 522.
8. "Brief on Behalf of Detroit Police Officers Association," for "Police Resi-
dency: Compulsory Arbitration" (August 1, 1975), pp. 15-19.
9. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
10. Ibid., p. 20: Quotation of Dr. George L. Kirkham from Transcripts of
testimony for "Police Residency: Compulsory Arbitration," vol. II, p. 29.
All further quotations from official transcripts of the proceedings will
be noted in parentheses by volume and page number. References to exhibits
are also from the proceedings.
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11. Dr. Bruce Danto (XIV, pp. 8-13), in ibid., p. 25.
12. Dr. Edward C. Dorsey (XIII, p. 85), in ibid., p. 25.
13. William H. Kroes, Bruce L. Margolis, and Joseph J. Hurrell, Jr.,
"Job Stress in Policemen," Journal of Police Science and Adminis-
tration 2 (1974);i 145-155, as Union Exhibit 16 and quoted in ibid.,
p. 27.
14. "Police Officers Residence Requirements (Ten Largest Cities)," Union
Exhibit 5 and quoted in ibid., p. 30.
15. Eugene C. Mathivet, Jr., (III, pp. 21-22) and quoted in ibid., p. 29.
16. Neither of these agencies, however, is concerned with law enforce-
ment functions, and the union ignored the fact that there is no
organizational coordination among the city, county, and state law
enforcement agencies. Ibid., p. 29.
17. Platt, "Opinion and Award," pp. 19-20; "Brief on Behalf of Detroit
Police Officers Association," pp. 35-77.
18. The city's statement of the question was based on Kennedy v. City of
Newark, 148 A.2d 473, 476 (NJ 1959). Quoted in "Brief of City of
Detroit," for "Police Residency: Compulsory Arbitration," p. 22.
19. "Brief of City of Detroit," p. 17. On March 22, 1976 the United
States Supreme Court made explicit its implication in the 1972
Detroit police residency case that residency requirements are not
inherently unconstitutional. In McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil
Service Commission, no. 75-783, the court upheld the power of
municipalities to require their employees to live within the cities
for which they work.
20. Ahern v. Murphy, 457 F2d 363 at 364 quoted in ibid., p. 18.
21. Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F Supp 492 (D NJ 1972) at 499, 500.
22. For instance, Shapiro v. Thompson, see n. 5 above.
23. "Brief of City of Detroit," p. 10.
24. "Detroit Police esident Location," City Exhibits 12 and 13; "Brief
of City of Detroit," p. 54.
25. "Brief on Behalf of DPOA," p. 50.
26. (VII, pp. 85-87) and quoted in ibid., p. 47.
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27. "Brief on Behalf of DPOA," p. 55; Platt, "Opinion and Award," p. 39.
28. "Brief of City of Detroit," pp. 49-50.
29. "Brief on Behalf of DPOA," p. 74.
30. "Brief of City of Detroit," p. 54.
31. Detroit Free Press, 3 March 1975; City Exhibits 7-16, 32 and 33.
32. Detroit Free Press, 3 March 1975; "Brief on Behalf of DPOA," p. 57.
The union's figures were cited from Joint Exhibits 17A and 17B and
from prior monthly police department reports obtained from Detroit's
labor relations department.
33. The city's argument was partially based on the fact that white of-
ficers usually live in predominantly white middle- and upper-middle-
class areas. In such communities, even when crime does occur, police
are less likely to apprehend their neighbors and fellow officers. In
many of these neighborhoods certain categories of law enforcement pro-
blems, such as juvenile delinquency, are often handled through informal
community sanctions.
34. "Brief of City of Detroit," pp. 34-35.
35. "Brief on Behalf of DPOA," p. 53.
36. Coleman Young, Mayor (IV, p. 125).
37. Ibid.
38. "Brief on Behalf of DPOA," p. 69
39. "Applicant Analysis - 1974," City Exhibit 39.
40. "Department Strength," City Exhibit 41.
41. "Applicant Analysis - 1974," City Exhibit 39; Ferrebee (X, 63-64).
42. Platt, "Opinion and Award," p. 27. According to the city, of Detroit's
5,418 sworn officers, only about 17 percent (923) were black as of
1975 ("Brief of City of Detroit," p. 37).
43. Coleman Young, Mayor (IV, p 1201,
44. Detroit Free Press, 7 February 1975.
45. Coleman Young, Mayor (IV, p. 124).
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46. Ibid., p. 123
47. "Brief of City of Detroit," p. 47.
48. Professor Jerome Skolnick (VI) and quoted in Platt, "Opinion and Award,"
p. 29.
49. Police Chief Tannian (V, pp. 84-95).
50. (V, 69; VI, 54) and quoted in "Brief on Behalf of DPOA," p. 80.
51. Patrick Murphy, Former Detroit Police Commissioner (VII, p. 11).
52. Detroit Free Press, 10 February 1975; "Brief of City of Detroit," pp. 57-58.
53. City Planner Yale Rabin (X, pp. 96-101) and quoted in "Brief of City of
Detroit," p. 60.
54. Rabin (X, pp. 103-105).
55. (VIII, pp. 85-87) and quoted in "Brief on Behalf of DPOA," p. 47.
56. Ibid., p. 46.
57. Detroit News, 9 March 1975.
58. Ibid.; Dr.Barbara Bryant, Vice President, Market Opinion Research Co.,
Inc. (IX).
59. "Police and Fire Survey," City Exhibits 18 and 19.
60. (IX, p. 26) and quoted in "Brief of City of Detroit," p. 64.
61. "Brief on Behalf of DPOA," pp. 41, 43-44.
62. Dennis Green, City Finance Director (IX, pp. 119-122).
63. Green (IX, p. 104).
64. Green (IX, pp. 124-125). In the 1974-75 budget the city contributed
$90 million to the pension fund.
65. Ibid.
66. The multiplier factor of 2 is based on the assumption that 50 percent of em-
ployee income is spent in the Detroit economy and 50 percent is spent outside.
Mattila used this multiplier to calculate the total indirect effect of a loss in
circulation of city employee money. In other words, in addition to the
direct loss of emoloyee income, the city would also suffer from the indirect
loss of expenditures in the local economy. According to Mattila, the ulti-
mate loss to Detroit would be double the income of each family. Dr. John
Mattila, Economist (IX, pp. 130, 133-134).
67. Mattila, (IX, p. 132).
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68. Calculated from figures cited by Matilla (IX, pp. 136-137)-and
presented in "Economic Impact of ... City Employee Families Moving
to the Suburbs," City Exhibit 27. The 5,000 figure was arrived at
by applying Yale Rabin's 20-percent pent-up demand figure to the
total of approximately 26,000 general city employees.
69. "Brief on Behalf of DPOA," p. 79.
70. Ibid., p. 78.
71. Ibid., p. 80.
72. The 1974-75 budget was $771 million; the tax-supported portion was
$616 million (Green, IX, p. 103). Approximately 45 percent of the
budget revenues was made up of local taxes, assessments, and interests.
Property taxes alone contributed about $158.8 million. Roughly 17 per-
cent of the revenues came from grants, share taxes, and revenues
which included state and federal revenue-sharing (Green, IX, pp. 106-107).
73. Green (IX, pp. 109-116).
74. Green (IX, pp. 11.5-116).
75. Robert Knox, real estate broker and former Detroit housing commissioner
(X, pp. 34-38).
76. "Brief on Behalf of DPOA," p. 81.
77. Green testified that 16.6 percent of the operating budget revenues
($521 million) were from "grants, share taxes, and federal revenue
sharing." This is $86.49 million (Green, IX, pp. 103, 196).
78. "Brief on Behalf of DPOA," p. 82.
79. Coleman Young, Mayor, "Letter to Harry Platt Concerning Police Resi-
dency Waiver Policy" (17 March 1975), City Exhibit 46.
80. An additional development, not mentioned by Young,further complicated
the feasibility of discretionary residency waivers. The 1973 New
Detroit Charter reorganized the police department, theoretically
dividing its management between a police chief (formerly commis-
sioner) responsible for daily administration and a five-member
civilian board of commissioners responsible for policy making. In
reality, there is considerable tension over the actual delegation of
authority. The source of responsibility for discretionary waivers
was seen as another bone of contention.
81. Detroit Free Press, 7 September 1975.
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82. Platt, "Opinion and Award," p. 32. See also n. 19 above.
83. Quoted in Platt, "Opinion and Award,n p. 35.
84. Ibid., p. 37.
85. Ibid., p. 40. Platt's conclusions on these points assume the ef-
fectiveness of twenty-four-hour duty. However the question, wheth-
er, even with a residency requirement, round-the-clock duty helps
deter crime and improve law enforcement, still seems open to empiri-
cal investigation.
86. Ibid., p. 41.
87. Ibid., p. 47.
88. Ibid., p. 57.
89. Skolnick (VI, pp. 107-108,111-112); Professor Albert J. Reiss, Jr.
(VII, p. 11).
90. Platt, "Opinion and Award," p. 53.
91. "Brief on Behalf of DPOA," pp. 3-5, 69-70.
92. Platt, "Opinion and Award," pp. 52-53.
93. Ibid., p. 54.
94. Ibid., p. 55.
95. Ibid.
96. "Brief on Behalf of DPOA," p. 31.
97. Platt, "Opinion and Award," pp.5 6-5 7.
98. Detroit Free Press, 7 September 1975. The DPOA may have preferred
to concentrate on its own compromise proposals (see Chapter 4, p. 80) rather
than the one suggested by Platt since discretionary waivers would
leave union members to the mercy of the police chief, a political
appointee. Accordingly, such a policy could be subject to political
manipulation and would not provide the union with any degree of con-
sistency or predictability.
99. Platt, "Opinion and Award," p. 58.
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Chapter 5
1. Detroit Free Press, 7 September 1975.
2. Ibid.
3. Caviston v. City of DetrOit Police Department, (5 February 1975), at
18, No. 73-259-171-DZ.
4. Idem at 16.
5. Detroit Residency Ordinance, No. 327-G; Ch. 2, art. 1, sec. 2-1-1.2
of the Municipal Code of the City of Detroit. See Chapter 1, n. 28.
6. Caviston v. City of Detroit Police Department, (supra, n. 3) at 17.
7. Detroit News, 6 February 1975.
8. Caviston v. City of Detroit Police Department, (supra, n. 3), at 19.
9. Police-Firefighters Act (PFFA), Act 312 of Michigan Public Acts of
1969 as amended by Act 127 of Michigan Public Acts of 1972, section 12.
The conditions for appeal also are cited in James L. Stern; Charles M.
Rhemus; J. Joseph Loewenberg; Hirschel-Kasper; Barbara D. Dennis;
Final Offer Arbitration (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath
and Company,1975)-, pp. 48-49.
10. Correspondence; Office of DPOA lawyers Gregory, Van Lopik, and Higle
(December 1975).
11. Detroit Free Press, 9 September 1975; Detroit News, 7 September 1975.
12. Correspondence: Office-of DPOA lawyers Gregory, Van Lopik, and Higle
(December 1975). Telephone conversation, May 1976.
13. Detroit Free Press, 9 September 1975.
14. As of May 1976 the city still had taken no action to discharge non-
resident police, despite its continual threats to do so.
15. Harry T. Edwards, "The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector,"
Michigan Law Review 71 (1973); 903-904.
16. For a discussion about the concept of multilateralism, see Hervey A.
Juris and Peter Feuille, Police Unionism (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington
Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1973), p. 45-50.
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17, This fear is expressed by John T. Dunlop in "Major Issues in New
Sector Bargaining," Emerging Sectors of Collective Barqaininq,
ed. by Seymour L. Wolfbein (Braintree, Mass.: D.H. Mark Publishinq
Company, 1970), p. 19.
18. Harry H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., make.this point in
The Unions and the Cities (Washington, D.C.; The Brookings In-
stitution, 1971), pp. 24-29.
19. Stern et al., Final Offer Arbitration, p. 49.
20. Edwards, "The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector," p. 911.
21. Ibid., p. 912; DPOA v. City of Detroit, 385 Mich 519 (1971).
22. For a complete discussion about PFFA see Stern et al., Final Offer
Arbitration, pp. 37-75.
23. Raymond Horton, "Arbitration, Arbitrators, and the Public Interest,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 28 (July 1975): 499.
24. Ibid., p. 501.
25. Michael J. Klapper, "Legislated Criteria in Arbitration of Public
Safety Contract Disputes," The Arbitration Journal 29 (June 1974):
126-127.
26. Ibid.
27. Stern et al., Final Offer Arbitration, p. 71.
28. Michael Lipsky, who coined the term; "street-level bureaucracy,"
defines street-level bureaucrats as individuals who, in their face-to-
face encounters with citizens, represent "government" to the people.
Lipsky, "Towards a Theory of Street-Level Bureaucracy," Mimeographed.
American Political Science Association, 1969.
29. Figures are cited from the Report of the National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders, Otto Kerner, Chairman (New York: New York Times Company,
1968), p. 322. Information about the cities' residency requirements is
from Robert M. Fogelson, "Big City Police" (Tentative title -- Unpublished
manuscript: 1976), Chapter 7, and from the letters replying to the San
Francisco Civil Service Commission survey of residence waivers, 1965, and
from Police Personnel Selection Survey (Washington, D.C.: International
Association of Chiefs of Police, 1968, 1971).
30. For instance, in Detroit a 1974 Federal Court order mandated the police
department to hire one female for every male hired (Ferrebee, Detroit
Police Department personnel director, X, p. 64).
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31. Police department figures quoted in Harry Platt, "Opinion and Award,"
in "Police Residency; Compulsory Arbitration" (5 September 1975), p, 12.
32. See Detroit Free Press, 24, 30, 31 July; 3 August 1975; Detroit News,
29, 30, 31 July 1975; Newsweek, 11 August 1975.
33. Ibid.
34. McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission, no. 75-783, See
Chapter 4, n. 19.
35. Juris and Feuille, Police Unionism, p. 146. Among the gains to public
employees achieved through joint decision making are wage and fringe
benefits, grievance procedures, and improved working conditions, See
also n. 40 below.
36. This finding sheds doubt or David Stanley's conclusion in Managing
Local Government Under Union Pressure (Wash., D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1972), pp. 32-33, that unions have "no effect" or
"little effect" on hiring policy because they are more interested
in matters such as promotions which directly affect their members.
37. Among those who attach some significance to the power of public em-
ployee votes are Stanley, Managing Local Government Under Pressure,
pp. 2-3; and Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New
York: Vintage Books, 1963), p. 212. Another possible reason union
status and demands were granted to public workers is that when an
executive order from President Kennedy made it clear that he approved
of public sector bargaining, the mayors followed suit and appealed
to liberal funding sources for support. This argument is summarized
by Margaret Anne Levi in "Conflict and Collusion: Police Collective
Bargaining," Technical Report (07-74) prepared for the Innovative
Resource Planning Project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(September 1974), pp. 207-208. (She cites James Q. Wilson, "The Mayors
vs. the Cities," The Public Interest 16 (Summer 1969): 25-37 and Frances
Fox Piven, "The Urban Crises: Who Got What and Why," 1984 Revisited,
ed. Robert Paul Wolff [New York: Knopf, 1973], p. 168.)
From her own research Levi offers a somewhat different explanation for
why officials granted union prerequisites to public employees: "collec-
tive bargaining was a possible and acceptable form of social control"
to gain labor peace (p. 208).
38. Theodore Lowi, "Machine Politics - Old and New," The Public Interest
(Fall 1967), pp. 83-92, esp. pp. 89-90.
39. Critics now charge that the bargaining system combined with the strike
and its threat allows unions too much power to affect matters outside
their normal realm of influence through political strategies such as
lobbying, referenda, and voting. For instance, Wellington and Winter
make this criticism in The Unions and the Cities, pp. 28-29, Interest-
ingly, the DPOA had attempted but failed to eliminate residency rules by
lobbying for a state amendment to restrict the powers of Home Rule cities
to pass such legislation.
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40. Levi makes this point on p, 219. in "Conflict and Colluasion; Police
Collective Bargainings"
41, For more detailed discussions about some of the impacts of public
employee unions see the two major comparative studies on municipal
employee organizations: David Stanley's Managing Local Government Under
Union Pressure and Hervey A. Juris and Peter Feuille, Police Unionism.
When Stanley asked his respondents whether public employee unions
had affected the administration of local government, the general answer
was "not much," Stanley explained;
Some forces tend to offset each other. For example, unions can
impair efficiency in a strongly organized department if they
accelerate cost increases and if they insist on work rules and
conditions that hinder the flexible use of managerial techniques.
On the other hand, unions may improve program effectiveness by
demanding that the organization be adequately staffed, by pressing
for equal levels of service throughout the city, or by insisting
on a sound safety program. The work performance of employees may
also be aided by the psychological security resulting from an
effective grievance procedure and good fringe benefits, or it may
be hindered by knowledge that desirable assignments are based on
seniority rather than performance (p. 139).
Sumner Slichter, James Healy, and Robert Livernash reached some similar
conclusions in their classic study in the private sector, The Impact
of Collective Bargaining on Management Wash., D.C.: Brookings Insti-
tution, 1960), pp. 946-961.
Slichter, et al. (pp. 946-954), Stanley (pp, 139-140, 145, 148-
149), and Juris and Feuille (pp. 150, 183) agree with the general
conclusion that by restricting management's discretion, insisting on
bilateral decision making, and increasing costs, unions and collective
bargaining have forced administrative personnel to act more like
management and to consider the consequences of their proposed actions.
At the same time, Slichter, et al. take pains to point out that the
diversity in the character and results of collective bargaining make
generalizations about specific impacts of unions hazardous (pp. 954-
957). This point is especially well-taken in the public sector given
the variations among state and local bargaining and political systems.
For a review of the research on the impacts of collective bargaining
in the public sector see Ralph T. Jones, Public Sector Labor Relations:
An Evaluation of Policy-Related Research (Belmont, Mass.: Contract
Research Corporation, February, 1975. Supported by the National Science
Foundation, contract no. NSF-C838), pp. 197-246, esp. "Other Impacts
of Public Sector Unions," pp. 225-233.
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